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Learning from Incidents in Airworthiness: A Novel Framework Tool for 
Safety Analysis 
 




Safe air travel is an expectation that we often invest little or no thought in. Fortunately, 
the industry has evolved to a stage where major air accidents are rare. Numerous lessons 
in aviation safety have unfortunately been paid for in the currency of human life. Many 
segments of the aviation industry support the idea that adverse and unwelcome events can 
be minimised through diligent reporting of incidents, event analysis and learning. The 
value of learning from incidents is not well supported in the implementing regulations. 
Therefore, little or no examination of learning inputs or outputs is required. 
The intent of the study was to understand how various situations impact on learning from 
incidents in the continuing airworthiness management segment. To gain an empathetic 
understanding of the participants and their actions, an interpretative approach was 
adopted. An analysis of potential research methods and means of data collection was 
performed. Thirty-four semi-structured taped interviews were carried out. A qualitative 
analysis process based on Thematic Analysis employing a six- phase approach was used 
in support of the study. 
The harvesting of information from incident reporting systems is a necessary input to 
continuously develop appropriate and effective training material. The inclusion of basic 
qualification criteria for human factor trainers in regulatory requirements should also be 
addressed. However, it is questionable if the perpetuation of these measures alone would 
support more effective delivery and application of lessons learned throughout the 
segment. One means of addressing this impending issue is to remodel regulatory, 
operational and training requirements to consider a new approach in the segment. 
Reflecting a combination of actions, events and conditions in a new basic model for 
human factor continuation training, may lay the foundations to better elucidate event 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
According to the 2019 ‘State of Global Aviation Document’ (ICAO 2019) “Improving 
the safety of the global air transport system is ICAO’s guiding and most fundamental 
strategic objective”. An 11 per cent global increase in the number of accidents for the 
period 2017 to 2018 for commercial aviation operations is recounted. Additionally, the 
global accident rate increased from 2.4 accidents per million departures to 2.6 accidents 
per million departures (8 per cent increase on the 2017 rate). The long-term traffic 
forecasts in the (ICAO 2019) report suggest: “global passenger traffic will almost double 
by 2032, reaching more than 6 billion passengers annually - compared to 3.5 billion in 
2016 - and there will be more than 60 million flights”. In concert with this revelation, 
according to the Boeing Aircraft Company long-term forecast 2015-2034 (Boeing 2015), 
global economic expansion is expected to continue. As a result, the number of airplanes 
in service is expected to double over the next two decades.  
 
1.1 Background 
Many industries have identified that the drive to safely increase output in tandem with 
safety practices has been of assistance in raising awareness of associated risks, (Carroll 
and Fahlbruch 2011). Investments in safety generally advocate some guarantee for future 
profitability in an airline organisation. As the public demands more safety and at the same 
time as it demands more services at less cost, corporate shareholders will continue to 
expect higher returns, (Carroll and Fahlbruch 2011). However, the overall cost of an 
aircraft accident or serious incident is difficult to measure in addition to loss of life, 
reputational damage and in monetary terms. Most accidents and incidents are investigated 
under an international article which is enabled by a legal obligation placed on a member 
States within which an accident or (defined) incident occurs. States are required to 
institute and manage an inquiry in accordance with the guidelines as the laws permit.  It 
is a fundamental International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) requirement for all 
(aviation) design, production, operational and maintenance organisations to subscribe to 
an occurrence reporting system. For example, in Europe Commission Regulation (EU) 
No 1321/2014 (1321/2014) that relates to the aircraft maintenance code Part 145 requires 
entities and individuals involved in maintenance to consider and report defined 
occurrences to a number of parties. In parallel, flight crew and other professionals are 
also obliged under similar operational requirements to submit mandatory reports.  
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For EU regulated (1321/2014) maintenance and continuing airworthiness activities, the 
Part 145 maintenance reporting requirement is predominantly intended to highlight 
technical and design issues that affect or could affect aircraft safety. European member 
states mandate reporting of any issue that could result or has resulted in an unsafe 
condition that seriously hazards flight safety. Following a comprehensive review of the 
EU legislation that supports accident and incident investigation, Regulation (EU) No 
376/2014 (376/2014) was developed. One of the main impetuses of this legislation was 
the recognition that expertise and regulatory framework requirements have had to evolve 
considerably over recent years. The directive also sets out to put greater emphasis on 
accident prevention by facilitating the holding of efficient and high-quality safety 
investigations. Some of the tasks and responsibilities associated with Regulation (EU) No 
376/2014 (376/2014) are the brief of dedicated air accident investigation entities and 
competent authorities. Member state occurrence reporting obligations appoint notarised 
aviation entities such as an aviation authorities to oversee the establishment “of an 
occurrence reporting system as part of the management system…..in order to contribute 
to the aim of continuous improvement of safety” (2018/1139). 
 
1.2 Research Objectives 
Aviation safety is hugely reliant on well-executed maintenance and competent 
management of the functions. In comparison to other inputs to aircraft operations, under 
performance relating to maintenance intervention may often be difficult to detect. There 
can be latent issues remaining undiscovered for some time until the necessary conditions 
arise for an undesirable event to occur. In addition to mandating the defining, recording, 
collating, a more agile framework for the sharing of events could yield a richer source of 
information in support of learning from incidents (LFI) syllabi. This research undertook 
a qualitative examination of staff involved aircraft maintenance and continuing 
airworthiness activities in order to identify factors that could support further learning from 
incidents within this industry sector. To achieve this, it was necessary to address the 
following objectives: 
O1. To review current literature on learning from incidents in order to identify factors 
that relate to learning from incidents. 
O2. To interview a sample of professionals working in the sector about reporting 
incidents and how learning from incidents is achieved in their organisations. 
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O3. To identify obstacles to learning and translate these into recommendations capable 
of setting a solid foundation for an improved appreciation of the benefits of learning from 
incidents. 
1.3 Research Questions 
To progress the objectives of the research, it was necessary to address the following 
questions: 
RQ1. What local mechanisms enable learning from incidents in an operational 
environment? 
RQ2. What obstacles to learning from incidents are experienced? 
RQ3. Why do obstacles to learning from incidents exist? 
The literature review illuminated a pressing need to address a body of work that remains 
to be performed within the segment under focus. The obligatory relationship between the 
expectation to potently learn from incidents and what is inferred in procedural form is not 
sufficiently appointed in domain requirements. This inherent deficiency may be a causal 
factor that has propagated a paradigm that undervalues the utility and capability of 
learning from incidents. Moreover, it may also be responsible for the light-touch approach 
to defining a regulatory architecture capable of empowering improvements in key 
learning participant competence requirements, defining a standard approach to causation 
and proffering a model that supports a standard learning product centric archetype. 
The thesis aims to offer a context for the four published academic journals. In addition to 
the Introduction chapter, the document comprises of five other chapters. An outline of the 
work performed within each subsequent chapter is described below and the relationships 
between research questions are reflected in figure 1.1. 
Chapter 2 details a systematic literature review performed in support of the research. The 
key purpose and motivations for the body of work are explained in the instalment. The 
research is of particular interest since systematic literature reviews are scarce in this 
aviation segment. The work provides evidence of impediments to learning from incidents 
(LFI) not only in parallel domains but also in aviation particularly, lack of effective focus 
on establishing appropriate event causation. 
Chapter 3 delineates the interfaces that enable a view of regulatory requirements that 
stakeholders must address in support of LFI. The chapter identifies regulatory gaps that 
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Figure 1.1. Map of inter-relationship between research questions and chapters. 
Chapter 4 progresses on the earlier chapters and provides further details of the qualitative 
study. Recognising one of the main aims of the research was to elucidate factors that 
enable LFI, the study reveals the benefits of just culture and formal recurrent training 
programmes in this respect. Limitations such as those aligned with poorly designed 
training syllabi and lack of mandatory requirements for key persons involved in training 
are highlighted as impeding factors. The chapter concludes with an overview of the 
framework applied to the study and the architecture of the study results. 
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Chapter 5 documents the learning potential a sample of incidents relating to Irish 
registered aircraft displayed. These events were drawn from an industry central repository 
database. A new incident learning archetype is introduced and suggestions how reported 
incidents can be successfully translated into learning and preventing recurrence are 
considered. 
Chapter 6 summarises the key achievements and also transverses the potential for the 
application of the research and possible future work execution opportunities.  
 
1.4 Overview of Methodology 
Interpretive research seeks to develop a richer understanding of the complex world of 
lived experience from the point of view of those who live in it. This goal is variously 
spoken of as an abiding concern for the life world, for the emic point of view, for 
understanding meaning, for grasping the actor’s definition of a situation, for verstehen. 
(Schwandt, 1994, p.118) 
The intent of this study is therefore to examine how various situations impact on learning 
from incidents in the aircraft maintenance and continuing airworthiness management 
domain. Thus, in order to gain an empathetic understanding of the participants and their 
actions, pursuit of ‘verstehen’ considers adopting an interpretive paragon as an approach. 
This viewpoint is also shared by scholars such as Walsham (1995) and Lee (1999) who 
consider this approach as appropriate when elements of human behaviour are being 
examined. 
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Figure 1.2. Overview of Methodology and relationships with chapters. 
Although many of the existing studies that illuminate behavioural and cultural aspects of 
organisations contribute greatly to the repository of knowledge, qualitative 
methodologies are popular in research areas. e.g. Myers et al. (2010) and Baxter and Eyles 
(1997). Crossler et al. (2013) suggest an expansion of studies that enlist qualitative 
techniques as a means of overcoming methodological challenges often associated with 
quantitative research. “Qualitative studies are not normally generally aiming to make 
statistically based generalizations through the application of formal comparable 
techniques” (Hart 2005). The research project employed a qualitative research 
methodology to generate ‘rich’ findings in support of gaining a good understanding of 
the learning environment in the featured domain. According to Maykut and Morehouse 
(1994), the purpose of qualitative research is to discover the inner world of perceptions 
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and meaning-making in order to gain an understanding, to describe and explain certain 
social phenomenon from participants’ perspectives.  
One of the first steps in the research phase (figure 1.2) was to make application to and 
receive Faculty of Science and Engineering Research Ethics Committee approval from 
the University of Limerick. As the unit of analysis was the individual, it was decided data 
would be collected with the assistance of a semi-structured template. Developing the 
template was assisted by the outputs of a systematic literature review (Okoli and 
Schabram 2010) that was performed concurrently with focus group (Kitzinger 1994) 
activity. The outputs from these activities informed the semi-structured template and also 
formed part of the architecture for the thematic analysis (Braun and Clarke 2006). Data 
arising from the systematic literature review was analysed with the assistance of thematic 
analysis (Braun and Clarke 2006) also. A content analysis (Weber 1990, Okoli and 
Schabram 2010) of pertinent regulatory material was also performed. 
In summary, the research undertook a qualitative examination of staff involved in aircraft 
maintenance and continuing airworthiness operations in order to identify factors 
impeding and augmenting learning from incidents within this industry sector. In order to 
gain an empathetic understanding of the participants’ experiences of these conditions, an 
interpretative paragon was adopted. In combination with the data arising from the study 
and the outputs from a systematic literature review, four published academic papers arose. 
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Preamble and Statement of Author’s Contribution Chapter 2 
The following chapter documents and presents the results of a systematic literature review 
performed within the parameters of defined search criteria. The publication reveals 
enablers and constraints to learning from incidents and could be used in support of reform 
to the associated domain regulatory codes. 
Author Contributions: Conceptualization, J.C. and K.I.K.; methodology, J.C.; formal 
analysis, J.C.; investigation, J.C.; validation, J.C and K.I.K.; data curation, J.C.; writing—
original draft preparation, J.C. and K.I.K.; writing—review and editing, J.C. and K.I.K. 
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Chapter 2. Learning from Incidents in Aircraft Maintenance 




The purpose of this systematic review is to highlight the salient elements of learning from 
incidents in the aircraft maintenance and continuing airworthiness management area. This 
involved the review of more than 1,000 publications reflecting practice in different 
domains. The cache was eventually distilled to 18 publications of relevance to learning 
from incidents. The systematic review of the literature was not intended to be exhaustive, 
but it was deliberately bound by the parameters of predefined search terms. A robust 
analysis was performed on the 18 distilled publications with the use of the NVivo 
software. A critical and systematic examination of this body of literature further supported 
the development of the five codification themes. The analysis of the literature revealed 
the benefits of a just culture as an enabler of reporting and learning from incidents. 
Moreover, it identified limitations inherent in the current body of knowledge. The most 
evident being a paucity of literature relevant to the featured industry segment. Some 
impediments to learning from incidents are also highlighted. Central to this is the 
prevalence of lack of effective focus and practice on satisfactory causation of events. 
Currently the efforts applied across many featured domains appear to be based upon 
ineffective legacy linear practices. However, emerging investigative philosophies that 
look beyond direct cause and effect contain opportunities for practitioners to consider 
causation through dawning axioms. This systematic review could be used in the European 
aviation regulatory activities associated with improving learning from incident in aircraft 
maintenance and continuing airworthiness management. 
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2.1 Introduction 
Freeman Dyson, the notable theoretical physicist and mathematician, once said, “Aviation 
is a branch of engineering that is least forgiving of mistakes” (Redding et al. 2017). It is 
true that such high reliability domains can pose a great degree of risk that may in turn 
contribute to mistakes being made. However, a guiding principle of continuously 
improving aviation safety is our ability to learn from events such as incidents. In the world 
of aviation safety, standards and recommended practices tend to be biased towards 
translating the experiences from such events into tangible outcomes aimed at preventing 
similar re-occurrences.  
A review of safety in aviation from the perspective of maintenance and continuing 
airworthiness management staff is key to understanding the relationship between safety 
and the concept of learning from incidents (Lukic et al. 2012). Despite the efforts of 
fallible humans and the ever-increasing complex systems they moderate, achieving a 
utopian reality where there are no risks or hazards present is clearly an unreasonable 
expectation (Perrow 1999). Safety in aviation has evolved along a continuum from the 
early 1900’s where aircraft mechanical and design issues were the primary contributors 
to aircraft accidents, according to the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) 
(ICAO 2013b). Improvements in these technical factors reached a plateau in the 1970’s 
and the challenges realised then were centred around human performance and limitations 
(Transport Canada 2003). Notwithstanding efforts and investment in human factor 
initiatives, accidents and incidents continued to occur. In the 1990’s there was a clear 
recognition that as the aviation industry continued to develop, there were a number of 
factors outside the human at play with a potential to affect safety behaviour (Hobbs 2001). 
This paradigm-shift informed today’s systematic approach to safety, and in particular the 
approach to learning from incidents (Leveson 2011).  
Most people relate safety to freedom from risk and danger (Reason 1997). Unfortunately, 
risk and danger are often ubiquitous in the presence of high reliability activities. 
Managing sources of risk and danger are a tall order for some organisations. The ICAO 
Doc 9859 (ICAO 2013b) recognises that “aviation systems cannot be completely free of 
hazards and associated risks”. However, the guidance does acknowledge that as long as 
the appropriate measures are in place to control these risks, a satisfactory balance between 
“production and protection” can be achieved. Perrow (1999) acknowledges that “we load 
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our complex systems with safety devices in the form of buffers, redundancies, circuit 
breakers, alarms, bells, and whistles” because no system is perfect.  
When one thinks of the word ‘incident’, it conjures up the notion of an action that may 
have grave consequences. Similarly, the word ‘accident’ is often used in the context of 
an unplanned event or a particular circumstance. In many industrial sectors and business 
domains, these descriptors are used with a degree of interchangeability when the words 
are applied to describe events. In the world of aviation, there are clear high-level 
definitions for both event categories, and these are based on potential for harm. 
Throughout aviation, learning from incidents is often considered to be one means of 
augmenting what Perrow (1999) terms “safety devices”. “Experience is the best teacher” 
according to Kleiner and Roth (1997) as they claim that the causes of the mistakes are 
often not featured and continue to be present in the absence of learning. In general terms, 
Nonaka (1991) suggests that creating new knowledge extends past a mechanistic 
approach and is strongly related to employees’ insights. An effective enabler of learning 
in this area is the collation of information on incidents. Details of the related processes, 
environment, procedures, competencies and implementing timely corrective actions all 
have a positive impact on learning and help prevent recurrence in the future. Learning 
from incidents is therefore mainly associated with post incident learning.  
Detecting and identifying hazards highlighted through incident reporting systems is 
recommended by International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) standards and 
recommended practices as an effective means of achieving practicable levels of safe 
operations. Therefore, objective data mined from a reporting system offers the potential 
to enlighten aviation stakeholders and to illuminate weakness that may be present. Such 
information can assist with a better understanding of events and augment mitigating 
measures against the potential effects of these hazards. When incidents occur, this can be 
an indication of a failure in an organisation’s process and/or practice. Due to continuous 
challenges faced by the organisations in the aviation industry there is potential to learn 
from resulting incidents and pre-cursors. The learning is based on the potential new 
knowledge available from the associated collection, analysis, and interventions of these 
events. Effective learning can be considered as a successful translation of safety 
information into knowledge that actively improves the operating environment and helps 
prevent recurrence of events we can potentially learn from. Learning in this context can 
often be experienced as modifying or implementing new knowledge where cultural, 
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technical or procedural elements are integrated. Therefore, when learning in this context 
is transformed into measures to prevent re-occurrence, an organisation often has a 
reasonable means of mitigating future similar events. 
The objective of this systematic review is to examine how learning from incidents occurs 
in aircraft maintenance and continuing airworthiness management and other sectors and 
what issues impact learning in those areas. It also intends to identify the contributing and 
constraining factors to learning from incidents. A qualitative review approach was 
selected as it has the advantage of providing a deeper contextual understanding of the 
literature and can assist with better research integration. Applying a degree of rigour and 
comprehensiveness can assist with advancing knowledge and identifying research gaps 
and aspects for further research in this particular area. 
The publication’s systematic literature review covered primary publications up until 
2017. As the subject of learning from incidents is a valid topic with potential to augment 
safety, a brief review of a cross-section of the latest publications was performed to see if 
a ‘delta’ in the knowledge exists. Insley and Turkoglu (2020) reaffirm aircraft 
maintenance is still a key point of concern within many areas of aviation. Their work 
highlights frequently recorded maintenance related consequences, naming runway 
excursions and air turn-backs in the highest percentile. The study identified factors 
relating directly to these events naming inadequate and incorrect procedures, poorly 
executed inspection tasks and incorrect installation as common causal factors ascribed to 
the event categories named. These issues are not unique to Europe. Habib and Turkoglu 
(2020) review a dataset of maintenance related incidents originating outside of Europe 
(Nigeria). Their analysis revealed causal factors such as poor aircraft husbandry, 
deficiencies in inspection and testing and inadequate safety oversight (organisation & 
regulator). Habib and Turkoglu (2020) also consider the consequential impact of errors 
as causal elements in subsequent events. They also highlight the increase in incidents 
recorded and attribute this to a recent increase in air movements. Batuwangala et al. 
(2018) present the idea that forecasted growth in air traffic requires a strong effort to 
ensure aviation incidents continue to be progressively reduced. They recognise a novel 
approach to safety improvements will need to be propagated in support of this. Although 
the authors point out some of the benefits of implementing a safety management system 
(SMS), they reaffirm the notion that not all areas of aviation operations are mandated to 
comply with SMS requirements. Some of the implementing constraints recorded by 
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Batuwangala et al. (2018) include, protection of safety data/reporters, lack of just culture 
& reporting and reporting system deficiencies to name a few.  
The review of the sample examining a cross-section of current research in the area of 
aircraft maintenance and continuing airworthiness does not identify any significant new 
knowledge in support of this publication. The additional exercise re-affirms the concept 
that some organisations are continuing to ineffectively embrace a desire to learn from 
incidents. 
2.2 Material and Methods 
In order to conduct an efficient and effective review, a structured approach was deemed 
necessary. Okoli and Schabram (2010) state that “a dedicated methodological approach 
is necessary in any kind of literature review”. An initial search of literature highlighted a 
scarcity of best-practice guidelines for conducting systematic literature reviews in the 
subject domain. This situation is also experienced in other sectors as Levy and Ellis 
(2006) and Webster and Watson (2002) confirm. Qualitative research involves handling 
considerable volumes of data and a degree of discipline is required so that search results, 
decisions regarding subject inclusions & exclusions are recorded and references are well 
managed.  
Endnote was used in support of the literature review during this research. An electronic 
database is useful for supporting a search strategy, arranging publications and storing 
references (Houghton et al. 2017). The qualitative data analysis software NVivo (NVivo 
2020) was used to augment the data management, storage and analysis associated with 
the literature review. NVivo possesses many functions that are capable of facilitating the 
synthesis of a review (Bandara et al. 2015). However, the software does not have the 
capability of understanding text and the analytical skills of a researcher cannot be replaced 
in this respect. 
The outcome of a qualitative research initiative are contextual findings as opposed to 
broad generalisations. Maykut and Morehouse (1994) (p.18) state that, “words are the 
way that most people come to understand their situations; we explain ourselves with 
words; we defend and hide ourselves with words”. Qualitative researchers seek out 
patterns in the words of participants’ transcripts. This study endeavoured to gain access 
to the realm of the study participants and their perceptions of the subject of learning from 
incidents. This also provided a rationale in support of adopting a qualitative technique. 
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The suitability of a qualitative methodology has been based on its capability to enable the 
following elements: 
• Capable of generating rich findings. 
• Possibility to understand participant attitudes. 
• A novel approach to the study of learning from incidents within the featured 
segment. 
• Ability to support researcher insights into the area of focus. 
• Allows the researcher to maintain an open outlook. 
• Offers a degree of flexibility to the researcher. 
• Cost effective means of collecting data. 
 In summary, qualitative research is based on a phenomenological locale. It is an 
encompassing approach that accounts for context within which human experiences arise 
and gleans learning from particular cases or events. Qualitative research attempts to gain 
access to the inner world of perception and to understand and explain the social process 
from the perspectives of the participants. In this situation, the approach is not initiated 
with the aid of a hypothesis intended for testing but rather using a focus that traverses the 
researcher to a point of discovery supported with an inductive modus operandi. However, 
this decision is not intended to undermine the effectiveness of quantitative techniques 
within this area of interest. The study is unwavering in its support for the view that 
(individual and combined) qualitative and quantitative approaches possess equal value in 
terms of their investigative potential in this area of focus. 
 
2.2.1 Search with Predefined Terms 
Bandara et al. (2015) suggest two main criteria to consider before a search to identify 
papers for extraction and review begins: the source and search strategy. The source 
considers which outlets and databases to target and the search strategy refers to the search 
terms and discipline to be exercised during the manuscript extraction process. A 
systematic search of the literature was performed in the following databases:  
• Web of Science (Web of Science 2020) 
• Scopus (Scopus 2020) 
• IEEE Xplore (IEEE Xplore 2020) 
• ProQuest (ProQuest 2020) 
• EBSCO (EBSCO 2020) 
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The following set of predefined terms associated with the thematic of the systematic 
review was selected to search in these sources. 
• ‘learning from incidents’ 
• ‘learning from experience’ 
• ‘aircraft maintenance’ 
• ‘aircraft management’ 
• ‘safety management systems’ 
This step concluded with the creation of an initial set of publications, which would further 
be filtered in next steps. 
2.2.2 Practical Screen of Title and Abstract 
In this step, each title and abstract were reviewed (practical screen). This part of the 
process had to be broad enough to create a sufficient number of applicable publications 
but also had to be practically manageable. The following criteria were laid down for the 
practical screen of the source bibliographic details, title and abstract: 
• Subject - Related to learning from incidents and past experiences 
• Setting – Any high reliability industry or sector where learning from incidents is 
critical.  
• Publication – Journal or peer reviewed conference proceedings 
• Date range – published post 1992 
The output of the practical screen step produces a list of publications denoted as the 
screened set of publications. An Endnote library was created to store and manage the full 
text of the retrieved publications.  
2.2.3 Classification to Primary and Secondary Publications 
This step involved the filtering (classification) of publications in the following two 
categories:  
• Primary publications - any research publication based on original data collected 
by the publications’ author(s) 
• Secondary publications - those publications based on data generated by somebody 
other than the author(s), e.g. a review and use of existing literature/data developed 
by another party.  
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Effectively, the screened set of publications was split over to a subset of primary 
publications and subset of secondary publications. Of those, in the next step, only the 
subset of primary publications was used. 
2.2.4 Application of Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria 
Brunton et al. (2012) suggests there needs to be explicit inclusion and exclusion criteria 
in order for the reviewer to screen titles and abstracts for topical, population, temporal 
and methodological relevance. Having a set of criteria helps to reduce any researcher bias 
in the screening system. A set of inclusion and exclusion criteria was developed 
considering the below objectives and in accordance with the guidelines included in 
(Meline 2006) and (Wienen et al. 2017): 
• To review current literature to identify factors relate to learning from incidents 
• To identify obstacles to learning from incidents 
• To make recommendations how learning from incidents might be improved in the 
aircraft maintenance and continuing airworthiness management sector 
In this context, the inclusion and exclusion criteria presented in Table 2.1 were used for 
the filtering of the subset of primary publications. The output of this step leads to the 
creation of the final set of publications. 
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Table 2.1. Inclusion and exclusion criteria used for the filtering of the subset of primary 
publications [table adopted from Clare and Kourousis (2021)] 
Included Excluded 
Research studies Literature reviews 
Qualitative and mixed methods Quantitative methods 
Perceptions and experiences 
 
Focused on decision-making and legislative 
requirements 
Reference to just culture  
High reliability settings  
Published post 1992  
Peer reviewed publications  
Industry based settings  
Original studies  
 
2.2.5 NVivo Analysis and Codification with Themes 
In this step, the Endnote library containing the final set of publications is imported to 
NVivo for further analysis. The following approaches, previously suggested by Bandara 
et al. (2015), were used for the selection of the codification themes: 
• Deductive – themes reported on are predetermined to some extent. In this case, 
these predetermined themes were the output of a focus group process. The present 
review paper does not report details on the focus group, as this is within the scope 
of a future research paper of the authors. 
• Inductive – themes reported are derived from analysis of the literature     
                                           
In addition to the three inductive themes (learning from incidents, just culture, pre-
cursors) arising during the literature review, two additional themes (root cause, reporting) 
were deduced from conducting focus group activities concurrently with the review. The 
aggregate of both of these efforts resulted in five themes being developed.  According to 
Kitzinger (1994), “focus groups are group discussions organised to explore a specific set 
of issues such as people’s views and experiences…”. The idea of conducting group 
interviews is not a new one. Bogardus (1926) is an early example of a reference to 
utilizing the group interview. Frey and Fontana (1991) say that group interviews can be 
formally structured for a specific purpose or can be performed in a more informal setting 
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where a researcher can “stimulate a group discussion”. A total framework of five nodes 
eventually representing the themes was constructed in the NVivo database and used in 
support of completing the systematic literature review. These five nodes were also later 
used as the main framework for the semi-structured interview template.  The description 
and origin (focus group or literature analysis) of the themes identified are described in 
Table 2.2. 
Table 2.2. Codification themes used in the NVivo analysis of the final set of publications. 
Codification Theme Description Origin 
Root Cause Reason to establish causation  Focus Group 
Reporting Value of reporting to learning from incidents Focus Group 
Learning from Incidents Outcomes of learning from incidents Literature Analysis 
Just culture Impact of just culture on learning from incidents Literature Analysis 




Using the codification themes, the final set of publication was searched using the NVivo 
software to extract and code the passages identified to any of the coding categories. 
NVivo only provides thematic classifications of data based on the occurrence of key 
words. This merely assisted in identifying common prescribed keywords in publications, 
enabling classification into categories or clusters of words and examination of 
relationships within these publications. As NVivo does not perform analysis, the 
researcher must search the outputs and extract meaning for themselves. Thus, each of the 
publications were physically reviewed inductively by the researchers. Effectively, the 
final set of publications was searched and coded to the Table 2.2 which has five themes. 
The coding process consisted of selecting relevant passages of text that were captured in 
one or several of the framework nodes. The overall document screening process and 
associated steps described in the previous subsections are illustrated in the flowchart of 
Figure 2.1. 
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Figure. 2.1. Flowchart of the overall document screening process and associated steps utilised 
in the systematic review. 
 
Maykut and Morehouse (1994) define a propositional statement as “a statement of fact 
the researcher tentatively proposes, based on the data.” Memos were used to draft these 
summary statements which form part of Section 3 of this paper. 
2.3 Results and Discussion 
In the first step of the process described in the Materials and Methods section of this 
paper, the search with predefined returned in excess of 1,000 publications (initial set of 
publications). From this tranche, a total of 239 publications were retrieved in the practical 
screen phase (constituting the screen set of publications), which were then classified to a 
subset of 53 primary publications and a subset of 186 secondary publications. The final 
set of publications was derived by applying the inclusion and exclusion criteria of Table 
2.1, leading to a total of 18 publications. The progressive filtering process is presented in 
the flowchart of Figure 2.2. 
 




Figure. 2.2. Output of the progressing filtering process applied during the systematic review, 
leading to the 18 publications (final set of publications). 
 
The 18 publications are summarised in Table 2.3, where the utilised methodology 
(qualitative, quantitative of mixed) and the application domain (different industries) are 
also provided.  
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Table 2.3. A summary of attributes of the papers arising from the systematic literature search. 
Paper Methodology Domain 
Atak and Kingma (2011) Qualitative Aircraft maintenance 
Drupsteen and Hasle (2014) Qualitative Chemical, construction, manufacturing 
Drupsteen and Wybo (2015) Qualitative Healthcare 
Drupsteen et al (2013)  Qualitative 
Chemical, construction, energy, 
government, metal, transportation. 
Furniss et al (2016) Qualitative 
Technology, transport, energy 
production and healthcare 
Gartmeier et al (2017) Qualitative  Healthcare 
Gerede (2015) Qualitative Aircraft maintenance/regulatory 
Gray and Williams (2011) Qualitative Healthcare 
Hall-Andersen and Broberg 
(2014) 
Qualitative  Engineering consultancy 
Hobbs and Williamson (2002) Mixed Aircraft maintenance 
Jacobsson et al (2012) Mixed Petrochemical, food & drug, energy 
Lukic et al (2012) Qualitative  Energy 
Pickthall (2014) Mixed Aircraft maintenance 
Silva et al (2017) Mixed 
Manufacturing, construction, 
production, and distribution of energy 
Steiner (1998) Qualitative  Production and distribution 
Storseth and Tinmannsvik 
(2012) 
Qualitative Railway and maritime 
Ward et al (2010) Qualitative Aircraft maintenance 
Zwetsloot et al (2017) Mixed Manufacturing, construction, other 
 
In the next step, this (final set) of 18 publications was analysed and codified with NVivo, 
using the five codification themes described in Table 2.2. This has led to the distribution 
of publications per codification theme shown in the flowchart of Figure 2.3.  
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Figure. 2.3. Distribution of the final set of (18) publications in the five codification themes 
following the NVivo analysis and codification step of the systematic review process. 
 
One can observe from this distribution that publications share some common codification 
themes. This is presented in Table 2.5, which provides the results of the mapping exercise 
of the 18 publication against each of the five codification themes.  
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Table 2.4. Mapping of 18 publications (final set of publications) against the five codification 
themes. 
 






 3 4 3 9 10 
Atak and Kingma (2011)    X  
Drupsteen and Hasle 2014  X   X 
Drupsteen and Wybo (2015) X    X 
Drupsteen et al (2013)     X 
Furniss et al (2016)     X 
Gartmeier et al (2017)    X  
Gerede (2015)  X   X 
Gray and Williams (2011)    X  
Hall-Andersen and Broberg 
(2014)    X  
Hobbs and Williamson 
(2002) X  X X  
Jacobsson et al (2012)   X  X 
Lukic et al (2012)     X 
Pickthall (2014)   X X  
Silva et al (2017)  X   X 
Steiner (1998)    X  
Storseth and Tinmannsvik 
(2012)    X  
Ward et al (2010) X X   X 
Zwetsloot et al (2017)    X  
 
Memos were used to draft the literature summary statements, which formed the final 
narrative for the synthesis. NVivo facilitated collation of the summary statements and 
enabled a transparent audit trail in support of the literature review exercise presented 
separately in sections under the five codification themes. 
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2.3.1 Root Cause 
An overview of the Jacobsson et al. (2012) study findings that relate to poor causation 
identification can be consolidated as follows: fewer event aspects recorded, often only 
operator error and technical failure recorded and shallow root causation. It was found that 
when limited analysis of underlying event causes is performed, only limited effective 
actions are possible. This is evident when poor root cause analysis only contributes to 
minor procedural and cosmetic changes are aimed at preventing recurrence. Such 
deficiencies were considered to have a limited impact upon the potential lessons available 
as a result of ineffective root cause establishment. 
Pickthall (2014) considers root cause through the lens of an individual’s competence 
when a technical and human factors-related impediment is present. The research 
examined the prevalence of these factors when aircraft maintenance staff perform fault 
diagnosis on complex aircraft systems. The researcher found that often maintenance staffs 
are unable to diagnose faults in an accurate and timely manner. The results of the study 
indicated that events are often caused by poorly resourced supports, such as system 
diagnostics and test equipment. On a practical level, these contributing factors are 
believed to have a negatively influence on the inability to establish adequate root causes 
and prevent the recurrence of faults. 
The Hobbs and Williamson (2002) research study explored patterns of potentially unsafe 
acts often perpetuated by aircraft maintenance staff. Violations (routine & exceptional) 
and mistakes were found to be closely related to deteriorating maintenance standards.  A 
potential relationship reinforces a link between violations and less than optimal safety 
standards. According to the researchers, root cause of such violations can often be traced 
back to the prevailing culture within the organisation itself. 
2.3.2 Reporting 
In their work, Gray and Williams (2011) examined whether culture surrounding learning 
from incidents can be compounded by “strategic defence routines”, resulting in 
recurrence of the event or similar ones. Their study was conducted through questionnaire 
in health services’ domains. They found that real learning from incidents can take place 
as a result of a transformation effort facilitated by a holistic approach. The authors refer 
to “re-framed learning approach”, however, the publication contains little practical 
exemplars which would expand more on the details and the applicability of a similar 
approach to learning from incidents. 
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Gartmeier et al. (2017) examined if reporting can be used as a strategy for workplace 
learning in a health service setting. They have considered error reporting attitudes and 
behaviours in a two-stage study performed via a longitudinal survey. The results suggest 
that organisations should highlight benefits of error reporting, ease of use and the 
accessibility of reporting systems is important, barriers can be modified to encourage 
reporting. 
Bjerg Hall-Andersen and Broberg (2014) conducted a “natural experiment” in an 
engineering consultancy firm. Following implementation of an information transfer 
database, discreet learning processes found to be interconnected within some domain 
elements. However, there is no evidence of collective interdomain learning across 
functions. The lessons learned are not through potential negative consequences and 
respective actions arising from a reporting system input but brokered through a moderated 
database. A single “embedded” case study may not support the generalizability of the 
results in other domains. However, for those who wish to develop a better understanding 
of learning processes across knowledge boundaries, the “implications for practitioners” 
contained in the study are considered applicable. 
Steiner (1998) conducted a qualitative study set in a workshop environment with data 
collected through semi-structured interviews, participant observations, document analysis 
and note taking. The theoretical shortcomings defined by literature that relate to barriers 
to organisational learning are discussed in the work. One may note that a consolidating 
feature of organisational learning, such as reporting of issues and data capture, are not 
adequately discussed in the study. 
Atak and Kingma (2011) conducted an ethnographic based case study in an aircraft 
maintenance environment, augmented by field notes, document reviews and interviews. 
Tensions between quality assurance and maintenance management were identified and 
the prevailing safety culture examined in the context of “integration, differentiation and 
fragmentation”. The study offers a comprehensive picture of the applied challenges 
experienced by aviation safety staff from an “embedded” perspective. However, the 
measures to prevent bias and understanding the issues are not well-defined in the 
publication.      
Pickthall (2014) examined the mixed methods approach using a structured interview 
devised from an academic format. This study examined issues that arose when aircraft 
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maintenance staff interacted with complex aircraft systems for defect rectification. 
Occasionally a “no fault found” determination has been found to be made. However, the 
fault-finding inputs in that case were ineffective, and the fault returned soon afterwards.  
The research considered the management influenced behaviours such as time pressures, 
poor communication, failure to adopt and share best practice, inadequate training, and 
reluctance to change. The work uncovered that indispensable resources, such as aircraft 
test equipment, integrated onboard diagnostic systems and maintenance manuals often 
fail to support maintenance staff when undertaking diagnosis tasks. The results suggest 
that these elements can actively constrain maintenance staff when they attempt to 
consistently manage effective and timely defect rectification. Moreover, the results are 
well presented and worthy of consideration when developing training material in support 
of learning from incidents. 
Størseth and Tinmannsvik (2012) performed a Qualitative study, using semi-structured 
interviews in marine and rail industries domains, to examine how individuals 
retrospectively look back and consider learning from events. Learning indicators for the 
study were developed by the authors in an earlier related study. The research methods 
were augmented by theoretical studies and document analysis. They have found that 
learning within organisations takes place within the parameters of “actor-context 
constellations” where there are no defined start and finish points. This assumption is not 
sufficiently balanced against the need to formally consider the exigency for structure 
when developing learning from incident outcomes. 
In their research study, Zwetsloot et al. (2017) endorse the importance of learning when 
implementing a “zero accident vision” in nonaviation-related domains. The work also 
highlights safety commitment, communication, and safety culture as learning enablers.  
Research design was a mixed method approach using a quantitative survey supported by 
interviews and workshops. The qualitative component of the research verified that 
learning was evident throughout the featured organisations. “Learning by doing” was 
considered a more effective approach in support of learning from incidents where 
employees are motivated to fully engage in the process, and supervisors can moderate 
theme-based safety dialogue. An extensive survey performed across 27 organisations. 
The qualitative methods (interviews & workshops) applied although they were not 
formally analysed, their synopses were used to validate the survey results. The survey 
component of the research records high scores relating to learning action; however, there 
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were differences noted between staff’s perception (and management) of learning action 
in approximately 25% of cases. Moreover, there was less diversity recorded across the 
learning condition dimension. The researchers considered this analogous to 
organisational commitment to safety. Safety commitment, communication, culture and 
learning were examined as individual aspects of implementing a zero-accident 
environment. However, their cumulative relationship was not fully examined, and the 
impact is not discussed sufficiently. 
Hobbs and Williamson (2002) conducted a mixed method study examining the 
application of a previously developed “three-way distinction” of unsafe acts questionnaire 
in an aircraft maintenance context. An initial questionnaire was developed through the 
application of a disciplined confidential critical interview technique with 72 aircraft 
maintenance mechanics. The results yielded 48 elements (validated by air accident 
experts) and transposed into a maintenance behaviour questionnaire distributed to 4,600 
licensed and 300 unlicensed aircraft maintenance mechanics (1359 questionnaires were 
returned). The principle component analysis was the method used to reduce the number 
of variables in the dataset for analysis by extracting those considered important to the 
study. The authors’ choice of analysis does not appear to consider the competence in the 
context of skill-based errors and complex situations such as automation. However, the 
focus the publication brings on the need for aircraft maintenance staff to be aware of the 
cumulative effect of “seemingly insignificant” incidents fortifies the need to be proactive 
when it comes to learning from incidents. 
2.3.3 Learning from Incidents 
The objective of  Lukic et al. (2012) study was to highlight factors considered to be 
important for effective learning, e.g., participants, process, incident and knowledge. Staff 
involvement and trust were positive attributes capable of supporting learning. Attributing 
blame and poorly developed root causation were found to detract from learning. The 
research also examined impact of formal and informal learning initiatives. Informal 
learning was found to be more difficult to record and codify and potential for learning 
could be limited in some cases.  In their paper Lukic et al. (2012) highlighted that the 
“over-simplification” of incidents and contend it is often the reason incidents are mis-
understood when attempting to translate incident and accident data into knowledge and 
learning. It is noted there is an absence of information on the structure applied to the 
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quantitative analysis and how rigour was applied to the process. However, the authors do 
clarify the analysis was both data and participant driven.  
The Gerede (2015) study considered some of the challenges associated with the 
successful implementation of safety management systems (SMS) in aircraft maintenance 
organisations. The SMS structure is comprised of “safety policy and objectives, safety 
risk management, safety assurance and safety promotion”. Safety risk management and 
safety assurance were found to be important elements underscoring the effectiveness of 
day to day activities. Failure to create a just culture and fear of punishment for reporting 
share a common cultural association. The situation is attributed to a potential combination 
of lack of trust and negative perceptions associated with organisational culture. Moreover, 
Gerede (2015) identified that the absence of communication and trust may present 
implementation challenges within the maintenance organisations. If a just culture does 
not exist at national aviation authority state level, then it is questionable if the 
implementation of an SMS would be effective. It is unclear if the four structural elements 
of safety management were fully considered during the training or the data gathering 
phase of the study. This may account for the absence of any direct reference to learning 
from incidents in the study’s findings. 
Drupsteen et al. (2013) conducted case studies with selected individuals in various 
domains, including transportation. Their survey considered the following elements: steps 
in the process where learning is lost, formal organisation of steps, efficiency of steps on 
a daily basis, difference between espoused and actual performance of steps and 
differences amongst featured areas. In their work they also state that “many incidents 
occur because organisations fail to learn from past lessons”, because the traditional 
approach often stops short of preventing future incidents.  The research paper presented 
a model that examines the investigating and analysing incidents, planning and prevention, 
intervening and evaluating steps in a learning process. The evaluation stage was found to 
be a primary learning bottleneck and reporting of incidents being next. Results indicated 
daily practice of learning was good but follow-up steps in the process are often neglected 
in comparison to incident analysis. There was a significant difference between how well 
the investigation and incident analysis stage and the evaluation stage were performed and 
organised. 
In their work Ward et al. (2010) offer a concise overview of key aspects of aircraft 
maintenance practice and present an accurate snapshot of the development and 
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architecture of pertinent regulation. Understanding the aircraft maintenance system 
complexities is an essential precursor to implementing improvements. Organisational 
processes cannot be explained in terms of a linear approach due to the non-linear 
characteristics of flexibility and variability of comprising elements. It was found that the 
resulting relationship between the individuals and the systems have a direct impact upon 
the system and prevailing environment. Their model comprised of the following 
elements: system level, process activity, dependencies and stakeholders. Four reporting 
veins were uncovered focusing on unique aspects of: product airworthiness and system 
performance, i.e. data inaccuracy, quality assurance, personal injury and occurrence 
reporting and suggested changes were highlighted. The researchers found that regardless 
of how an issue presented, staff continue to experience performance constraints if 
communication remains poor. 
Jacobsson et al. (2012) acknowledge the degree of interest invested in learning from 
incidents but question the efficiency of learning from incidents in some organisations. 
They found that event investigations often stop short and only partially deal with some of 
the elements affecting the event. Although unwelcome events are less prevalent, less 
severe events provide learning opportunities. Analysis of the learning cycle is valuable 
and such an approach can offer an insight into inherent precursors to accident conditions. 
They present a model featuring: reporting, analysis, decisions, implementation, and 
follow-up in an incident learning cycle format.  Assessing effectiveness of an incident 
learning cycle was designed from analysing each individual step against the following 
dimensions: scope, quality, time and information of the first cycle loop. A general 
assessment of the second learning loop was performed using participant interviews.  
Subject matter experts applied their judgement in support of developing weighting factors 
for each of the model elements. The paper refers to the analysis of incident learning 
systems but the purpose of conducting the safety audit is not specified. The relationship 
(if any) between the outcome of the safety audits and the efficiency of the learning 
systems does not appear to be fully articulated. 
Silva et al. (2017) examine how organisations use accident information to reduce the 
occurrence of unwelcome events. They suggest it is necessary to achieve a balance 
between adequately resourcing safety initiatives and maintaining acceptable levels of 
safety. They suggest that factors such as organisational culture, just culture and event 
data, if managed can contribute to a reduction in events. Learning within organisations 
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should address effective information processing and interpretation. Combining technical 
and social strategies resulted in uncovering four patterns of practice that corresponded to 
different levels of learning.  
In their work, Drupsteen and Wybo (2015) conclude organisations use experience gained 
from past events in order to improve safety. They introduce the term “propensity to learn” 
which refers to an organisation’s predisposition to learning and suggest an organisation 
can apply lessons from past events such as warning signals, mistakes, incidents and 
accidents. They found that hindsight can determine if an organisation did learn from an 
event but there are no models to assist with gauging the “propensity” of an organisation 
to learn. The object of the study was to expound two sets of indicators that would 
contribute to gauging an organisation’s inclination to learn. Using a previously validated 
questionnaire the participants’ perception was assessed on learning indicators. They 
deduced from the review of literature that organisations displaying high learning 
propensity were also successful with learning from experience and sharing lessons 
amongst staff. Indicators based on three categories (attitudes, organisational conditions 
& systems) utilizing six indicators were developed to gauge organisational learning. A 
second set of indicators was developed in support of assessing individual propensity to 
learn from experience, specifically measuring attitude towards each of the stages of a 
generic learning process i.e., detection, analysis, follow-up, evaluation and sharing 
information. However, as the study was based solely on the perception of staff, it is 
unclear if the presented indicators alone would be satisfactory to elicit enough potentially 
subjective data to reinforce the results. 
Furniss et al. (2016) examined the Hollnagel (2004) Functional Resonance Analysis 
Method (FRAM) which explores how functional variability resonates within systems. i.e., 
how well elements work together in a system. They also discuss how FRAM can be 
modified to support complex socio technical system improvements. This is presented in 
the context of four principles that encase the main assumptions (equivalence of success 
and failure, approximate adjustments, emergence, functional resonance) from a FRAM 
practitioner perspective. Their study considered how human factor methods “are 
functionally coupled to a broader system of human factors practice” (Furniss et al. 2016). 
The four steps of the FRAM analysis were augmented by two additional steps: the 
purpose of FRAM analysis and respondent validation.  
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Drupsteen and Hasle (2014) examined if organisations can learn more effectively from 
past incidents, future incidents could be prevented. They suggest that learning can be 
improved if limiting factors are addressed. The learning process in different companies 
was analysed and discussed. The researchers used a topic list to assess if human, technical 
or organisational aspects were being addressed and which elements related to specific 
learning phases. They found that some of the main causes of the constraints to learning 
can be related to lack of knowledge, unwillingness to report, causation not established, 
uncertainty regarding follow up action. Some conditions that enable these deficiencies 
are centred around misplaced cultural issues, over-focus on direct causation, poorly 
defined safety management procedures for example. The benefits of considering all active 
and latent failures as direct and indirect causes, respectively, are unclear. The study 
concentrated on the latency of causation. The authors state learning from incident 
initiatives should exercise a more generic effort to support prevention. However, one of 
the limitations stated was the lack of homogeneity amongst the participating 
organisations. 
2.3.4 Just Culture 
Ward et al. (2010) endorse the perception that aircraft maintenance is a “highly regulated, 
safety critical, complex and competitive industry”. They also state that to positively 
perpetuate the above attributes, it is necessary to further develop an operational model 
that can account for “what is meant to happen and what actually happens”. A just culture 
is defined as “where people feel they can report mistakes made without fear of 
punishment”, (deliberate acts of damage or violations are different). The researchers 
proffer that a just culture can be considered as an effective enabler of good quality 
incident reporting. 
Gerede (2015) examines some of the challenges associated with the implementation of 
the ICAO SMS standards and recommended practices which support the aviation industry 
and regulators to transition from prescriptive oversight methods to those based on 
performance metrics. These challenges relate to the successful propagation of a just 
culture which is considered as a basic principle of successful SMS implementation. The 
study strongly suggests that a failure to foster a just culture would be considered to have 
a negative impact upon effective data collection (reporting), organisational learning and 
the subsequent ability to learn from incidents. 
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Silva et al. (2017) put forward the value of information gleaned from incidents in support 
of learning and future event prevention.  They examine how organisations utilise 
information and the strategies that assist with the propagation of lessons. They also 
highlight the need for organisations to encourage a learning culture and suggest the 
positive contribution made by reporting. It was found that a seminal element of 
organisational learning is a just culture, where errors and mistakes can be reported, and 
violations are managed fairly. In parallel, it is suggested that proportionate organisational 
responses are required to balance safety and accountability. 
In their work, Drupsteen and Hasle (2014) proffer that learning from past incidents can 
assist with understanding potential future events and possibly reduce their consequences. 
The study examines the causes associated with organisations failure to learn from 
previous events. Trust and openness were identified as key elements necessary for 
organisational learning.  In the absence of these values, under-reporting is often evident. 
The researchers point out that the presence of what they term a “blame culture” also 
inhibits learning as potential reporters fear of being treated un-justly for their actions. 
2.3.5 Precursors 
Ward et al. (2010) suggest improvements can be gained when organisational factors with 
a potential to contribute to incidents are understood. They consider these elements in the 
context of the Reason (1997) taxonomy (immediate, workplace & organisational) of 
factors as systemic precursors. An improved understanding of these elements can also 
shift the focus of unwarranted blame from “the individual” within the system. Aviation 
maintenance management systems are increasingly adopting an approach where 
identifying systemic precursors contribute to a just outcome. 
The main purpose of the Drupsteen and Wybo (2015) study was to develop a set of 
indicators capable of determining an organisation’s “propensity to learn”. The 
researchers argue that the most effective set of indicators are those that could be 
proactively considered as “leading indicators”. Precursors that represent activity-based 
inputs can signal early degradation of safety systems. 
One of the main aims of the Hobbs and Williamson (2002) study was to ascertain if unsafe 
acts could be predicted as a result of analysing self-reported unsafe acts. Their analysis 
of demographic variables suggested that the occurrence of routine and exceptional 
violations was associated with a participants age. Higher levels of associated behaviours 
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were linked with younger participants. The researchers were able to identify potential 
precursors to aircraft quality issues by association with less than optimal performance of 
aircraft maintenance staff. The analysis implied a distinction exists between what are 
termed routine and exceptional violations. The former tends to be more frequent and can 
be associated with short-cuts linked to routine tasks. The latter group are of a high-risk 
nature but occur less frequently. 
2.3.6 Common Limitations Identified in the Reviewed Publications 
Although there was a distinctive scarcity of information across the reviewed literature 
relating to the domain under primary investigation, enablers, and challenges to learning 
in the featured preserves were well noted, learning from incidents across all domains 
shares a kindred desired outcome of delivering lessons that help prevent recurrence of 
similar incidents in the future. However, throughout the review, a few common 
limitations were discovered in the literature, summarised as follows: 
i. All research papers do not follow the same discipline of section title and content 
ii. Few of the reviewed publications feature enough detail in the methodology 
sections to aid with the exact replication of the featured study. 
iii. Details of piloting and testing data gathering instruments such as semi-structured 
templates were scarce. 
iv. The robustness of some analyses was difficult to determine. 
v. Where the study featured participant perceptions, gauging the efficiency of 
lessons learned was not well supported in the text. 
vi. Safety culture and just culture are mentioned as pivotal to learning. However, the 
is no solid mechanism featured in support of objectively measuring either cultural 
component in an aircraft maintenance and continuing airworthiness management 
environment. 
vii. The literature review uncovered many instances of formal learning. It was noted 
that informal learning practices were not well represented. 
 
  
  Page 43 of 140 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
The primary aim of learning from incidents is to support actions that contribute to 
preventing recurrence of unwelcome events. The literature review revealed the existence 
of a solid formal architecture capable of delivering lessons within the featured domain 
activities. However, learning from incidents is not specifically articulated as a 
requirement and therefore presently not all elements required are explicitly articulated 
with the regulatory code. Although some domain requirements mandate formal training, 
informal learning initiatives are not required to be capitalised upon. Additionally, 
inadequate incident causation can deflect from potential learning opportunities arising 
from reporting. Poorly resourced efforts to establish appropriate causation are recorded 
as a central impediment to learning. The importance of reporting (incidents) and enabling 
facilitators such as the presence of a just culture cannot be overstated. Encouraging a 
reporting culture also reflects positively on the potential to learn from reported incidents. 
The literature review also revealed the prevalence of similar constraints to learning in 
other industries. Lukic et al. (2012) highlight the increasing focus on learning from 
incidents in the health, safety and environmental areas of the energy industry. They put 
forward factors they consider to be important for effective learning which bring a focus 
on; the participants of learning, types of incident, types of knowledge and learning 
process. The Drupsteen et al. (2013) industrial research (chemical, construction, energy, 
governmental metal, transport) states that “many incidents occur because organisations 
fail to learn from past lessons”. They point out that the traditional approach to learning 
often features only a careful analysis and formulation of lessons in the hope future 
incidents will be prevented. They suggest that, in addition to focusing on prevention of 
re-occurrence, the learning process should be improved which in turn can contribute to 
making an organisation safer. Others such as Jacobsson et al. (2012) question the 
efficiency of learning from incidents in some organisations (petrochemical, food and 
drug, energy) but suggest there is value in the analysis of the learning cycle. Such an 
approach can offer an insight into inherent weakness that often enable accidents.  Silva et 
al. (2017) examine how organisations (manufacturing. construction, production, 
distribution of energy) use accident information to reduce the occurrence of unwelcome 
events. They acknowledge there is a need to achieve a balance between adequately 
resourcing safety initiatives and maintaining acceptable levels of safety. In healthcare, 
Drupsteen and Wybo (2015) suggests an organisation can apply lessons arising from past 
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events such as warning signals, mistakes, incidents and accidents. Hindsight can assist 
with determining if an organisation did actually learn from an unwelcome event, and their 
study expounds two sets of indicators that could contribute to gauging an organisation’s 
inclination to learn. By considering the outputs of research in domains parallel to 
continuing airworthiness, the benefits of proven approaches in other industries could be 
leveraged and applied without further delay.  
Many aspects of current literature are developed from a linear or sequential view of how 
an accident/incident occurs.  This of course might be an appropriate place to start to 
examine the retrospective aspects of learning that an unwelcome event can provide. 
However, more proactive models such as the Hollnagel et al. (2015) FRAM Model as 
highlighted by Furniss et al. (2016), are very capable of delivering more sustainable 
lessons.  Nevertheless, it is evident from the literature search and review that research in 
the aircraft maintenance and continuing airworthiness management arena are yet not well 
represented in respect of learning from incidents. 
One potential benefit of digressing from the traditional view of causation is that models 
like FRAM can be applied in support of specific analysis frameworks capable of 
deciphering: what went wrong, hazards that may have not been previously considered and 
the feasibility of potential solutions to prevent recurrence. As human systems and 
artificial intelligence continue to occupy shared workspaces, an appreciation of exactly 
how the system works is essential in order to deliver effective lessons when unwelcome 
events do occur. Further research in the continuing airworthiness area utilizing forward 
looking frameworks such as FRAM will have a positive impact on better understanding 
event causation. It will also present a need to examine and augment legislative 
requirements to support the needs of regulatory and ethical oversight of systems that 
employ a blend of human and autonomous functionality. It is believed that the systematic 
review could be used to refine terms of reference for a European legislative working 
group tasked with improving the content of the implementing regulations in the area of 
learning of incidents within the context of SMS’s in aircraft maintenance and continuing 
airworthiness management organisations. 
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Note 1: A fundamental principle of applying effort to accident and incident investigations 
is to establish what happened and using this information to assist with preventing 
recurrence of the event. However, two appointed entity practitioners for the investigation 
of accidents and incidents were excluded from the study. The following criterion was 
applied in support of this: 
State Investigation Authorities (SIA’s) 
• SIA’s are appointed to investigate ICAO Annex 13 related accidents and 
incidents. The scope of this body of work was bound by the parameters of 
continuing airworthiness activities and related events only. 
National Aviation Authorities (NAA’s) 
The exclusion of national aviation authority inspectorate staff from the data gathering 
phase was based on the following elements; 
• The national aviation authority in the jurisdiction of the study did not support the 
study. The absence of an endorsement from senior authority figures was felt could 
pose a significant challenge for potential participants (Based on previous 
experience). 
• The culture within the subject national aviation authority is underpinned by a 
compliance paradigm. A focus on achieving a high score in EASA standardization 
audits, ICAO oversight audits and DOT Section 32 audits is embedded within 
many of the comprising departments and supporting philosophies. Moves are 
afoot to shift the basis from pure compliance to a blend of compliance and risk-
based oversight methodologies. As previously noted by UK CAA (CAP1642 
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2018) there are a number of ‘structural’ items that must be addressed prior to such 
a paradigm shift being achieved. Namely, cultural, procedural and governance 
organisational components. Consequently, it was considered that the application 
and use of the continuing airworthiness requirements in industry may have moved 
ahead of the regulator because risk currently informs many of the decisions and 
actions applied in an ever-increasing number of continuing airworthiness 
organisations. It was therefore decided that the inclusion of aviation authority staff 
may introduce a distortion into the outcome of the study results. 
• During the ‘ideation’ process in the early stages of planning the PhD, it was 
apparent that if the researcher was aligned with the national aviation authority, the 
data-gathering and its quality might be impeded amongst industry participants. 
• From a professional point of view, the researcher felt that ‘unsponsored’ research 
would be viewed as unadulterated and more acceptable amongst industry 
practitioners and the academic communities. 
• Many opportunities for further research tend to be revealed during academic 
studies. However, due to time constraints, self-funding restrictions, family 
obligations and employment commitments, such studies must be bound by some 
form of parameters. 
 
Note 2: A degree of convention is required when developing inclusion & exclusion 
criteria in order to avoid bias and introduce a level of uniformity to ensure a literature 
review remains systematic. Therefore, the researcher considered it important to maintain 
the integrity of the study by applying the criteria below. The justification and rationale 
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Inclusion rationale 
Research studies The systematic literature set out to establish a baseline for the study. In order 
to present a productive outcome, research studies that arose as a result of 
applying defined search terms was deemed to be a productive approach. 
Qualitative and mixed 
methods 
Qualitative studies enable a researcher to make sense of reality and to 
explain the phenomenon observed. This approach is helpful when 
developing explanatory models. These aspects were considered to be 
congruent with the tasks the researcher was pursuing in support of the study. 
The decision to include mixed methods was based on the idea that they are 
useful in understanding any contradictions that may exist between 
quantitative results and results arising from qualitative methods. 
Perceptions and 
experiences 
Studies that captured participant experiences and perceptions were of 
interest because the thesis research intended to capitalise on these strands. 
The researcher was interested in the impact on previous studies and also 
how this locale might impact the literature review content. 
Reference to just 
culture 
Just culture is a fundamental in learning from incidents within aviation 
environs. The researcher was interested in how just culture impacts other 
high-reliability domains. 
High reliability settings Academic information and protocol for conducting literature reviews in the 
continuing airworthiness domain is scarce. Examining how other domains 
consider learning from incidents was deemed worthy of inclusion. 
Published post 1992 At the time of the literature review twenty-five years was considered to be a 
reasonable period to consider learning from incidents literature. 
Peer reviewed 
publications 
The researcher considered peer reviewed publication inclusion essential 
because such publications tend to focus on specific research questions and 
present accurate conclusions based on robust research efforts. 
Industry based settings The position of industry is important. Growth and development can manifest 
ahead of academia and regulatory function within the aviation segments 
under focus.  
Original studies Reviewing original studies allows a researcher to assess the independence of 
thought and originality of findings as opposed to considering these through 
the lens of another researcher’s position. 
 
Exclusion criteria 
Literature reviews These criteria were intended to support a systematic review of literature as 
summoned by search terms on specific databases. In order to preserve the 
originality of the initiative and prevent any possibility of introducing bias 
from other reviews, it was decided to not include this facet of literature. 
Quantitative methods The thesis research was primarily engaged with assessing perception of a 
cohort in a particular environment. The outcome of quantitative studies was 
not considered capable of augmenting these efforts. 
Focused on decision-
making and legislative 
requirements 
A content analysis of regulatory material mandated for use by approved 
entities within the segment was conducted separately. 
  Page 48 of 140 
 
Concluding statement 
In this Chapter, a systematic literature review of learning from incidents has been 
presented. The outputs from the chapter make a contribution to the body of knowledge in 
terms of highlighting enablers and impediments to learning from incidents (LFI). The 
following chapter 3 examines the European legislative requirements that affect the ability 
of organisations to learn from incidents. 
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Preamble and Statement of Author’s Contribution Chapter 3 
Chapter 3 details a critical and independent evaluation of regulation and practice that can 
affect the ability of European Union regulated aircraft maintenance and continuing 
airworthiness management organizations to learn from incidents. 
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Chapter 3. Learning from Incidents in Aircraft Maintenance 
and Continuing Airworthiness: Regulation, Practice and Gaps 
 
Abstract. 
Purpose - The ability to learn from previous events in support of preventing future similar 
events is a valuable attribute of aviation safety systems. A primary constituent of this 
mechanism is the reporting of incidents and its importance in support of developing 
learning material. Many regulatory requirements clearly define a structure for the use of 
learning material through organisational and procedural continuation training 
programmes. This work reviews aviation regulation and practice, highlighting the 
importance of learning as a key tenet of safety performance. 
Design/methodology/approach – Applicable International Civil Aviation Organisation 
requirements and the European Union (EU) regulation in aircraft maintenance and 
continuing airworthiness management have been critically reviewed through content 
analysis. 
Findings – This review has identified gaps in the European implementing rules that could 
be addressed in the future to support a more effective approach to the delivery of lessons 
in the aircraft maintenance and continuing airworthiness management sector. These 
include light-touch of learning and guidance requirements, lack of methodologies for the 
augmentation of safety culture assessment, absence of competence requirements for 
human factors trainers and lack of guidance on standardised root-cause analyses. 
Practical implications – This paper offers aviation safety practitioners working within 
the European Aviation Safety Agency regulatory regime an insight into important matters 
affecting the ability to learn from incidents. 
Originality/value – This paper evaluates critically and independently the regulation and 
practice that can affect the ability of EU regulated aircraft maintenance and continuing 
airworthiness management organisations to learn from incidents. The outputs from this 
research present a fresh and independent view of organisational practices that, if left 
unchecked, are capable impeding the incident learning process. 
Keywords Airworthiness, Aircraft, Accident investigation, Aircraft maintenance, 
Aviation Safety. 
Paper type General review 
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3.1 Introduction 
Throughout aviation history, learning from incidents has been considered to be one means 
of augmenting what Perrow (1999) terms “safety devices”. “Experience is the best 
teacher” according to Kleiner and Roth (1997) as they claim that the causes of the 
mistakes are often not fully accounted for and continue to be present in the absence of 
learning. In general terms, Nonaka (1991) suggests that creating new knowledge extends 
past a mechanistic approach and is strongly related to employees’ insights. An effective 
enabler of learning in this area is the collation of information on incidents. Details of the 
related processes, environment, procedures, competencies and implementing timely 
corrective actions all have a positive impact on learning and are generally intended to 
help prevent recurrence in the future.  
Learning from incidents is mainly associated with post incident learning. When we think 
of the word “incident”, it conjures up the notion of an action that may have grave 
consequences. Similarly, the word “accident” is often used in the context of an unplanned 
event or set of circumstances. In many industrial sectors and business domains, these 
descriptors are used with a degree of interchangeability when the words are applied to 
describe events. In aviation, there are clear high-level definitions for both event 
categories, and these are based on potential for harm. The International Civil Aviation 
Organisation (ICAO) defines (ICAO 2010): 
1. Accident, as “an occurrence associated with the operation of a plane that takes place 
between the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight until such time 
as all such persons have disembarked, in which:  
• A person is fatally or seriously injured.  
• The aircraft sustains damage or structural failure.  
• The aircraft is missing or is completely inaccessible”. 
2. Incident, as “an occurrence, other than an accident, associated with the operation of 
an aircraft that affects or could affect the safety of operation.” 
However, the presence of international legal obligations for maintaining safe aviation 
systems are intended to support individual state responsibilities when developing 
statutory safety requirements. In Europe, international standards and recommended 
practices (SARP) are transposed into national/European law, forming the basis of state 
oversight and operator obligations. Aviation regulations and the laws they are derived 
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from are intended to establish standards and enable a benchmark for safe operations. 
Apart from setting out to support acceptable levels of safety within aviation segments, 
some references to learning are contained within the implementing regulatory framework.  
This paper reviews the evolution of aviation regulation, with a focus in the aircraft 
maintenance and continuing airworthiness sector, examining the way in which 
regulations mandate learning from incidents. It also discusses how lessons are translated 
into best practice and what aspects of regulatory oversight affect the sector. The present 
work, utilising a systematic content analysis approach, offers a new and independent view 
on important matters that may have a negative impact on the incident learning process. 
3.2 Material and Methods 
The paper features the concept of learning from incidents as grounded in enabling 
legislation. Within this area, operational activity capabilities are determined by very 
specific regulations and recommended practice. The static architecture of these domain 
requirements considered in the analysis thereby sets out the parameters of the documents 
qualifying for review.  
To perform an efficient and effective review, a structured approach was required. Okoli 
and Schabram (2010) state that “a dedicated methodological approach is necessary in 
any kind of literature review”. In the editorial section of Weber (1990) the editor proffers, 
“content analysis classifies textual material, reducing it to more relevant manageable lots 
of data”. However, the author (Weber 1990) later reveals the presence of an inherent issue 
with the method by suggesting that words, phrases or other units of text are assumed to 
have a similar meaning when classified in the same category. The issue being that such a 
distillation resulting from category-based reduction could semantically limit the inference 
arising from the analysis. As the primary function of aviation legislation is to support the 
achievement of acceptable levels of safety, it was established this constraint would not 
negatively impact the scope of the review. 
At an international rule-making level, ICAO develops aviation safety, security and 
environmental protection requirements. The organization also moderates (SARP) relating 
to the technical aspects of aviation, which form the basis of ICAO state signatory primary 
aviation legislation e.g. Chicago Convention (ICAO 1944), Annex 19 (ICAO 2013a). 
Additionally, as the paper relates to a European jurisdiction, it is also necessary to 
consider the requirements underpinning aircraft maintenance and continuing 
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airworthiness management.  Basic regulations such as European Union (EU) Regulation 
2018/1139 (2018/1139), implementing EU Regulation 1321/2014 (1321/2014) were 
essential inclusions when analysing activity in the sector.  
3.2.1 Inclusion/exclusion criteria 
Stansfield and Thomas (2012) suggest a need to develop inclusion/exclusion criteria to 
support a thorough documentary review. Having a set of criteria helps to eliminate 
potential researcher bias during the review process. Inclusion and exclusion criteria were 
developed in concert with the objectives presented below and guidelines contained in 
Meline (2006): 
• To review salient underpinning international aviation safety management 
requirements for the domain specific area. 
• To review the appropriate European aircraft maintenance & continuing 
airworthiness safety management requirements. 
• To identify regulatory gaps and potential enhancements capable of improving 
learning from incidents. 
The inclusion and exclusion criteria used in this study are presented in Table 3.1. 
 
Table 3.1. Inclusion and exclusion criteria. 
Included Excluded 
ICAO Chicago Convention (ICAO, 1944) 
ICAO Annex 13 (ICAO, 2010) 
ICAO Annex 19 (ICAO, 2013a) 
ICAO DOC 9859 (ICAO, 2013b) 
EU Regulation 2018/1139 (EU, 2018) 
EU Regulation 376/2014 (EU, 2014a) 
EU Regulation 1321/2014 (EU, 2014b) 
EU Regulation 996/2010 (EU, 2010) 
Non-legislative domain publications relating to 
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3.2.2 Document review 
Bowen (2009) relates the analysis of documents to giving voice and meaning around a 
topic under assessment. The subject documents supporting the review were selected as 
those mandated by the enabling requirements for the aviation domain activities. The 
review process took advantage of the following steps: 
• Assemble the texts under review. 
• Verify their applicability. 
• Consider the presence of reviewer bias and mitigate. 
• Ensure the process is supported by adequate domain knowledge. 
• Consider any ethical issues that arise. 
• Document the outcome of the review of each individual requirement with the 
scope of the analysis. 
The following section presents the output from this process.  
3.3 The regulatory framework 
3.3.1 International Civil Aviation Organisation 
The ICAO member states, and additional groups are involved in the rulemaking process. 
These stakeholders work together to reach a consensus in support of efficient, effective, 
and sustainable aviation regulation. The related practices and policies are applied by 
member states within the parameters of their incumbent legal frameworks. Each member 
state in cooperation with its civil aviation authority transpose the requirements into 
national implementing regulations. For example, Ireland’s Air Navigation and Transport 
Act (1946) and subsequent amendments transposed the Chicago Convention (ICAO 
1944) elements into Irish law, comprising of Acts, Orders and Statutory Instruments. The 
regularising of a standard approach to aviation regulation in Ireland which the Act enabled 
was an antecedent to the current body, the Irish Aviation Authority (IAA), which today 
discharges the State’s aviation oversight responsibilities in Ireland.  
 
3.3.1.1 ICAO Chicago Convention – the basis for formalising structured aviation 
regulation 
The work initiated by the Chicago Convention signatories (ICAO 1944) was monumental 
in terms of the foundations it laid for regulations supporting a common global air transport 
system. The Convention enabled the establishment of ICAO, which has worked since its 
inception to support, foster and manage the international cooperation necessary to 
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augment safe air transport. Its main remit is to “secure international co-operation and the 
highest possible degree of uniformity in regulations and standards, procedures and 
organization regarding civil aviation matters” (ICAO 1944). This has contributed to 
aviation continuously pursuing levels of safety that made it one of the safest forms of 
transport.  
The Convention is supported by nineteen annexes that contain SARP’s. The SARP’s 
provide guidelines for all activities that relate to air operations, licensing, navigation, 
aircraft maintenance and safety management. While the Convention does not contain any 
technical requirements for learning from unwelcome events/incidents, Annex 13 (ICAO 
2010) (aircraft accident and incident investigation) and Annex 19 (ICAO 2013a) (Safety 
Management) provide a framework to harvest information that can be applied to learning 
initiatives and prevent similar events. 
3.3.1.2 ICAO Convention Annex 13 - aircraft accident and incident investigation 
ICAO Annex 13 (ICAO 2010) assists states with the application of a consistent approach 
to investigations. The sole purpose of conducting an ICAO Annex 13 investigation is to 
use the outcome to prevent accidents and incidents through applying lessons learned and 
not apportion blame or liability. Causation and contributing factors must be established 
for aircraft accidents and serious incidents so that every effort can be applied to prevent 
recurrence. The establishment of causal factors is most efficacious when a standardised 
approach is applied for accident prevention.  
The ICAO Annex 13 defines the responsibilities, obligations and entitlements of affected 
parties when safety events are investigated. It also contains a requirement to produce a 
final report that may contain safety recommendations. In effect, the state receiving a 
safety recommendation is obliged to implement procedures to monitor the progress of 
tasks required to address the issue. From an accident prevention perspective, states are 
obliged to establish and maintain an accident and incident database. This database is 
intended to facilitate the analysis of event information and assist in revealing safety 
deficiencies. These outputs assist states to promulgate lessons to be learned in support of 
accident and incident prevention. In addition to the accident prevention capabilities of the 
ICAO Annex 13, further provisions for the collection, analysis and prompt exchange of 
safety information are contained in the ICAO Annex 19 Safety Management (ICAO 
2013a) and the ICAO Document 9859 Safety Management Manual (ICAO 2013b). 
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3.3.1.3 ICAO Convention Annex 19 - safety management 
As the aviation industry’s interactions and complexity continue to increase, safety 
management practices are evolving so that risk can be managed more strategically. Safety 
risks can be best addressed if managed proactively through adequate regulatory 
infrastructure and appropriate enabling elements. In 2010, ICAO recommended the 
development of a dedicated Annex to define state safety management responsibilities. 
This was achieved by consolidating safety management detail from six other Annexes 
into Annex 19. Each states’ safety management responsibilities are represented in the 
form of pillars comprising of the following: a state safety programme (SSP), objectives 
and resources, risk management, safety assurance and promotion. The ICAO Annex 19 
lays out detail to ensure the continued availability of safety data and information required 
to augment safety management (ICAO 2013a). This standard requires 
states to establish a safety data collection system capable of capturing, storing, 
aggregating, and analysing safety data. The purpose of collectively analysing safety data 
is to identify systemic hazards that may not be revealed through the lens of an individual 
entity analysis. ICAO Annex 19 also requires states to accord protection to data derived 
from reporting. A high degree of protection is considered necessary to foster an active 
reporting environment, in turn, supported by a just culture. Additionally, states are 
encouraged to take steps to promote a positive safety culture and encourage reporting. 
ICAO Annex 19 makes provisions to share safety information across states, when mutual 
safety matters of interest are identified. 
3.3.1.4 ICAO Document 9859 - safety management manual 
The ICAO Document 9859 (ICAO 2013b) (safety management manual) provides 
guidance on the development and implementation of an (SSP) and it is applied in 
conjunction with ICAO Annex 19 (ICAO 2013b). The manual’s structure reaffirms the 
basics of the effective application of safety management. SSPs and safety management 
systems (SMS) are considered in relation to their interaction with other annexes. A 
philosophy for implementing SMS by the aviation industry and a progressive approach 
for states implementing and maintaining SSP’s is described. The productive role that 
ICAO state civil aviation authorities play in the implementation of SMS for industry is 
also emphasised.  
ICAO Document 9859 (ICAO 2013b) states, “culture is characterized by the beliefs, 
values, biases and the resulting behaviours that are shared by members of a society, 
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group or organization”. An understanding of an organisation’s cultural components and 
their importance to safety management is reaffirmed here. Improvements to the safety 
management process can be achieved when safety is instilled as a value within an 
organisation (ICAO 2013b). Learning from incidents is an active output from a positive 
safety culture. Progressive state and industry stakeholders are actively directed to pursue 
improvement. ICAO Document 9859 (ICAO 2013b) encourages stakeholders to leverage 
safety benefits from remaining vigilant to hazards by utilizing safety data arising from 
reporting, data analysis and investigations. The document attributes improvement in the 
civil aviation safety records to “a continuous learning process based on the development 
and free exchange of safety information”.  
One area in the ICAO Document 9859 (ICAO 2013b) where reporting, analysis of data 
and learning make an effectual contribution to safety is when entities collectively consider 
deviations (operational and otherwise) from an organisation’s baseline safety 
performance. The resulting ‘chasm’ is often termed “practical drift” (Snook 2000). 
Experience gleaned from reporting informs us that this condition can occur for various 
reasons, i.e., technology not operating as intended, procedural deviations due 
environmental conditions, change, and interaction with other systems. The document 
reaffirms the importance of capturing deviations or drift as early as possible. The 
predictive value of this information cannot be overstated when early intervention to 
restore a satisfactory condition can be made without delay. Additionally, the resulting 
lessons learned can be applied to system, procedural and structural improvements to 
prevent event recurrence. 
 
3.3.2 European Union Regulations 
Member states of the EU are obliged to comply with regulatory outputs from the 
European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA). EASA, among other functions, supports the 
European Commission (EC) in the technical development and compliance oversight of 
aviation regulations and monitors and approves organizations involved in the 
maintenance of aviation products, with the desired outcome of safe operations. Moreover, 
a major aspect of EASA’s work is to analyse safety and research data. 
 
3.3.2.1 EU Regulation 2018/1139 - common rules in civil aviation in the EU 
EU Regulation 2018/1139 (2018/1139) aims to establish and maintain a high level of 
safety in the EU aviation. This regulation covers design, production, maintenance and 
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operation of aircraft and their parts. It also affects aircraft operating in and out of the EU 
and defines the role of EASA. Amongst EASA’s administrative functions is its 
responsibility to perform safety oversight of aircraft maintenance and management 
organisation activities, managing these responsibilities through implementing 
regulations. Similar to the ICAO requirements, EU Regulations (376/2014) and 
(1321/2014) facilitate the exchange of safety information amongst EASA and the national 
civil aviation authorities. Therefore, this regulation enables EASA to moderate a structure 
that collects, exchanges and analyses safety related information (2018/1139). It also 
mandates that there are provisions ensuring the collected information and data is securely 
stored and protected. An electronic database is recommended, as an efficacious repository 
to manage and exchange data in support of preventing recurrence of events. 
 
3.3.2.2 EU Regulation 376/2014 - reporting, analysis and follow-up of occurrences in civil 
aviation 
The EU, in recognition of its duty of care to the travelling public, acknowledges that it 
must continue to improve aviation safety performance. Based on the imminent increase 
in aviation activity, significant challenges loom if the EU is to only preserve current levels 
of safety. Thus, to remain abreast of the future challenges, EU is transitioning towards a 
proactive aviation risk-based safety system (EU 2015). The desired outcome is that 
member states and industry will work together to collect data for early identification of 
hazards and implementation of mitigating actions. This enables focusing oversight efforts 
where they can be most effective for safety management purposes. The EU Regulation 
376/2014 (376/2014) was developed to enable the collection, analysis, and follow up of 
occurrences for a performance-based safety oversight system. This regulation  recognises 
that, “while the ability to learn from an accident is crucial, purely reactive systems have 
been found to be of limited use in continuing to bring forward improvements” (376/2014). 
However, it suggests that these reactive systems should be bolstered by “proactive 
systems which use other types of safety information to make effective improvements in 
aviation safety” (376/2014). This is largely left up to each organisation to develop their 
own “proactive system” in conjunction with the ICAO Annex 19 on SMS. One collective 
element addressed by this regulation is the reporting of incidents and accidents. 
A main tenet of the reporting system is the ability of an individual to report any hazard or 
potential hazard in a “free and frank” manner. This element of a safety culture’s 
philosophy is to be supported by “just culture”, where the outcome for the individual is 
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not based on punitive measures or being inappropriately punished for reporting or co-
operating with occurrence investigations. This regulation has provisions for mandatory 
and voluntary occurrence reports. There are discriminating conditions that must be met 
to determine when to report a hazard. Organisations are required to have a process to 
implement a timely follow-up and notification of their analysis to the aviation authority. 
Reporting entities are encouraged to submit reports to a portal moderated by EASA. 
Aviation authorities have access to the portal and the incidents and accidents are 
categorised in accordance with a standard aviation data reporting program (ADREP) 
taxonomy and uploaded to a European coordination for accident and incident reporting 
systems database (ECCAIRS). This database assembles (multi-modal) transport safety 
data.  
3.3.2.3 EU Regulation 996/2010 - investigation and prevention of accidents and incidents in 
civil aviation 
The EU Regulation 996/2010 (996/2010) supports safety by enabling efficient and 
effective investigations. It also requires the provision of certain information to state 
investigating authorities (SIAs) in a timely manner in relation to all persons and 
dangerous goods carried on board an accident aircraft. This regulation applies to the 
investigation of accidents and serious incidents as specified in the ICAO Annex 13 (ICAO 
2010). The following are some of the accidents and incidents where this regulation applies 
(996/2010): 
• Accidents occurring in EU member states. 
• Accidents occurring outside of EU member states but involving an EU registered 
aircraft or being operated by an EU operator, where EU member states are entitled 
to appoint an accredited representative or have a special interest, such as where 
EU citizens are involved in an accident or serious incident.  
This regulation stipulates that SIAs are independent from oversight or other state safety 
aviation roles, such as aviation authorities. SIAs must be functionally independent and 
capable of conducting a full safety investigation whilst being adequately resourced.  
Effectively, SIAs investigate accidents and serious incidents so that lessons can be 
learned, and recommendations can be made to help prevent the occurrence of similar 
events. SIA’s release several different publications that contain this information. These 
reports fall into the following categories: interim and final reports, accident and serious 
incident reports, safety bulletins and foreign accident reports. For example, under Irish 
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law, investigations enabled by EU Regulation 996/2010 and ICAO Annex 13 are required 
to be independent of judicial proceedings and are in no way intended to apportion blame 
or liability (460/2009).  
3.3.2.4 EU Regulation 1321/2014 - continuing airworthiness and approval of organisations 
and personnel 
The EU Regulation 1321/2014 (1321/2014) specifies the compliance requirements 
necessary for persons and organisations involved in continuing airworthiness activities. 
The regulation comprises of specific requirements for:  
• Maintenance organisations (Part 145).  
• Continuing airworthiness management organisations (Part M). 
• Maintenance personnel (Part 66). 
• Maintenance training organisations (Part 147). 
Collectively addressing these requirements theoretically means the associated processes 
supporting airworthiness ensures an aircraft is fit for safe flight. Organisations operating 
under EU regulations must formally engage a (CAMO) to support the maintenance 
management function. The purpose of CAMO is to ensure that all mandatory 
requirements are addressed, and the aircraft continues to be maintained in an airworthy 
condition. The CAMO manages and forecasts maintenance, and through formalised 
agreements, ensures the necessary maintenance inputs are performed by an aircraft 
maintenance organisation (AMO), on time and to the correct standard.  
Aircraft maintenance and continuing airworthiness activities are affected by regulations 
mandating the reporting of issues that could affect safety. These mandatory occurrence 
reporting responsibilities also extend to individuals who hold privileges within 
organisations, under this regulation (1321/2014). The individual requirements that enable 
the EASA Part 145 and Part M code activities require the reporting obligations and 
responsibilities to be stated in procedural form in the companies’ expositions. This is to 
support the organisation’s mandatory occurrence reporting system, which collects, 
analyses, and evaluates reports. The organisation must identify adverse trends and 
implement timely corrective actions. Both EASA Part 145 and Part M requirements 
encourage the distribution of internal occurrence reporting outputs to staff. Learning 
material is used to raise awareness of reported issues, and therefore assist with preventing 
a recurrence of the event or similar events. 
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The importance of occurrence reporting cannot be overstated when attempting to identify 
contributing factors and the potential emergent lessons. This regulation recognises the 
positive impact a functional just culture has as it encourages “free and frank” reporting. 
Reporting is further augmented when staff are aware that those who report will not be 
inappropriately punished for doing so or for co-operating with ensuing investigations. 
This psychological contract is further reinforced by the presence of a closed-loop process 
that requires the reporter to receive feedback to their report.  
Figure 3.1 offers an illustration of the overall ICAO and EU regulatory landscape 
described in the previous section, where the interactions and relations of the requirements 
and regulations are shown. 
 
Figure 3.1. The ICAO and EU regulatory framework surrounding safety management; focused 
on aircraft maintenance and continuing airworthiness management. 
 
3.4 Implementation of regulations 
3.4.1 Framework and compliance 
The EU Regulations 376/2014 (376/2014) and 1321/2014 (1321/2014) require the 
operation of a SSP, similarly to ICAO Annex 19 requirements (ICAO 2013a). The aim 
of SSP is to proactively discover and manage factors that may contribute to incidents and 
accidents and to fortify the maintenance and operational systems against errors. For 
AMOs (EASA Part 145) and CAMOs (EASA Part M), the associated responsibilities 
must be reflected within procedural form for each code. Details of these procedures are 
prescribed in the EU Regulation 1321/2014 (1321/2014). This detail covers basic training 
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and competence requirements for staff and managers, reporting requirements, initial and 
recurring human factors (HF) and training in procedures for managing reporting systems.  
When organisations apply to civil aviation authorities for the privileges that relate to 
aircraft maintenance and continuing airworthiness management, compliance audits are 
performed by the authorities to ensure the applicant can perform the necessary tasks. Each 
approval has a 2-years cycle and authorities must perform continuous oversight to ensure 
that organisations remain in compliance. Each EASA Part 145 and Part M organisation 
must perform annually a complete programme of internal audits by their independent 
quality assurance system. Aviation authorities and regulated organisations apply the 
regulatory detail in a similar manner when measuring compliance with each code. For 
both maintenance and continuing airworthiness management reporting, occurrence 
reporting system and responsibilities are a subset of the overall audit programme.  
3.4.2 Reporting 
Lessons from events and incidents are derived from several sources within the aviation 
system. ICAO Annex 13 accidents and serious incidents are supported with the 
publication of thorough and independent non-biased reports. Often based on causal or 
contributing factors, safety recommendations may feature elements that affect the 
maintenance or management function or both. Depending on who the investigating 
authority directs the safety recommendation to, affects how the lesson is promulgated to 
industry stakeholders.  
 
3.4.2.1 Internal and external reports 
Internal company occurrence reporting systems that underpin the identification of issues 
relating to flight safety or the release of a safe product, are valuable sources of data for 
learning within EASA Part 145 and Part M organisations. According to the EU 
Regulation 1321/2014 (1321/2014), organisations are required to have a system to collect, 
analyse, develop interventions as required and promulgate lessons to prevent 
reoccurrences. When organisations deliver initial and continuation HF training, they must 
feature a cross-section of lessons arising from internal occurrence reporting and operating 
experience. Organisations also have to look outside their own specific areas and introduce 
lessons from other areas of the industry.  
Occasionally, incidents that arise through internal occurrence (voluntary and mandatory) 
reporting are required to be reported to external bodies such as aviation authorities, 
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aircraft manufacturers or SIAs. These entities will review the incident and decide if 
further information or intervention is required to terminate their request. All incidents 
reported to aviation authorities are collated and published on an annual basis. These 
reports are made available and operators, approval holders and individuals are encouraged 
to review and assimilate, as necessary. These reports are often used in support of EU 
Regulation 1321/2014 (1321/2014) continuation training syllabi. Moreover, in a case 
where it is found that aviation regulation was a contributing factor to an event, a safety 
recommendation may be directed to EASA. If accepted by the recipient, it can be a 
catalyst for regulatory amendment. The amended regulation is then brought to the 
attention of staff through an internal training mechanism mandated by EU 1321/2014 
(1321/2014). In the case of accidents and serious incidents arising from factors relating 
to aircraft design or maintenance error, lessons may be learned through the conduit of 
mandatory communications, the Airworthiness Directives (ADs). ADs require immediate 
recognition and recipients are legally obligated to comply within defined timeframes. 
3.4.2.2 Databases and reporting standards 
Databases containing details of events with known potential and latent ancillary 
contributors can be monitored with the assistance of continuous analysis. For example, in 
the United States (US), a combined effort by various industry stakeholders, known as the 
Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS), collects voluntary reports. The outputs from 
ASRS set out to identify system deficiencies and corresponds directly with individuals in 
positions that can affect improvements and corrective actions. These reports are often of 
interest to organisations operating aviation products that have originated in the US.  
SARP that define an ICAO state obligations have been developed as a result of the 
collective efforts of participating states, i.e. ICAO Annex 13 (ICAO 2010) defines the 
standards requiring the reporting of accidents involving aircraft with a maximum take-off 
weight (MTOW) of 2,250 kg and above. The same document contains details of 
reportable incidents deemed important for accident prevention for 5,700 kg MTOW 
aircraft. An accident/incident data reporting system (ADREP) is operated and managed 
by ICAO, with safety data from the member states received, verified, and retained in 
ADREP. This global repository reflects the aggregate of state-reported 
occurrences/incidents/accidents. The following outputs are available from ADREP: 
• Annual statistical presentation of broad categories of information broken into 
headings, such as event types and operational phases. 
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• Report summaries delivered on bimonthly basis illustrating a global view of 
‘significant’ reported events. 
• Feedback to ICAO states in response to requests for ADREP information. 
 
The ICAO Accident/Incident Reporting Manual (ICAO 2014) defines the report content, 
its composition and means of transmittal to ICAO. A taxonomy is used to standardise the 
inputs for reporting. One of the difficulties faced by the ADREP system administration is 
that some of the state reporting systems do not strictly apply this taxonomy. However, to 
improve harmonisation and exchange of information, regulated entities affected by EU 
Regulation 2018/1139 (2018/1139), have already migrated to the ICAO common ADREP 
taxonomy. The ADREP software platform currently in use by ICAO was developed by 
the EC and was made available for implementation in the middle of the 2010s. While 
some ICAO states process reports manually, the basic software is available free of charge 
and it is expected most national reporting systems will be capable of transferring data by 
electronic means. The outputs from the ADREP system are useful for HF training 
programmes and offer a solid dataset to compare national against global event rates.  
3.5 Results and Discussion 
Regulations empower aviation authorities to affect a certain degree of oversight to 
reporting and learning systems. However, in aircraft maintenance and continuing 
airworthiness there are a few areas where legislation does not support learning from 
incidents within organisations. Without a standardized approach to learning from 
incidents, it is questionable if the benefits can be fully realised from current efforts. 
Organisational and regulatory oversight does not have the mandated scope to decipher if 
the incident learning content of HF training is being delivered effectively. Oversight and 
quality assurance audits merely verify that a company is delivering HF training and 
because the regulations do not articulate the need to go any further, and the quality and 
impact of the training material is left to the organisation. This issue is often compounded 
by the struggle for compliance, specifically minimum compliance, which many 
organisations demonstrate and could be considered a by-product of regulatory gaps. The 
following subsections present and discuss the results from the review of the EU codes for 
aircraft maintenance and continuing airworthiness management. 
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3.5.1 Light-touch learning and guidance requirements 
Safety requirements are scoped to support the achievement of an acceptable level of 
aviation safety. At the same time, affected industry segments will often lobby rule makers 
in an attempt to decrease the effect of an impending regulation. Therefore, the larger 
industry segments have a strong degree of influence over the final drafts of regulatory 
requirements. These are common challenges for the EC in the relation to rulemaking. In 
the case of EU 1321/2014 (1321/2014) and EU 2018/1139 (2018/1139), these must be 
generic enough to support the industry segments but also satisfy stakeholders other than 
aviation regulatory entities. The aviation industry is continuing to demand more 
efficiency, sometimes under the veil of corporate social responsibility but often without 
additional tangible safety outcomes.  
The expanding regulatory oversight burden that comes with an increase in aviation 
activity is not sustainable if the paradigm of light-touch learning and guidance 
requirements continues to prevail. The EU Aviation Strategy (EU 2015) commits to a 
shift from the current regulatory model to a risk-based oversight system. This will direct 
resources at areas of risk in the industry. Effectively, this should lessen financial outlay 
for member states while it will preserve and further develop acceptable levels of safety if 
supporting regulatory frameworks evolve. Regardless, implementing rules must be 
amended to address a means of defining a simple life-cycle approach to learning from 
incidents and how learning can be measured and improved where necessary.  
3.5.2 Absence of minimum competence requirement for human factor trainers 
The review of EU 1321/2014 (1321/2014) highlights the absence of competence and 
qualification requirements for staff delivering HF initial and recurrent training. 
Additionally, there is no defined or accepted practice specified for assessing the depth of 
student learning or the assimilation of learning outcomes. HF training feedback is 
required to be used by the custodians of the training programmes. The intent is that the 
information received from students will strengthen future training programmes. In the 
programmes developed and delivered, the learner’s ability and style are not required to 
be considered. Redeveloping and expanding guidance on regulatory feedback is one 
mechanism capable to support an improved design template that could be used in support 
of learning from incidents. Even though compliance with HF training syllabi 
requirements are verified, the current requirements do not extend far enough to support 
the need for increased measurable learning effectiveness to underpin risk-based oversight. 
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If the current regulatory requirements for the delivery of lessons learned are not redrafted 
to reflect a standard for the preparation of initial and recurrent HF training, assessment 
and competence requirements for trainers, the improvements anticipated from the risk-
based methodologies shall not to materialise in full. 
 
3.5.3 Methodologies to augment assessment of safety culture 
Regulations require staff to receive continuation training at least every two years. The 
advent of EU requirements has stood the industry in good stead and has contributed 
greatly to achieving acceptable levels of safe operations. To achieve the maximum impact 
from training (especially material featuring lessons learned), it would assist to 
periodically assess the prevailing cultural conditions within an organisation. Currently 
there is no regulatory requirement that supports such an assessment. The EU Regulation 
2018/1139 (2018/1139) refers to the “promotion of a culture of safety” as it relates to 
reporting of incidents. The term “just-culture” is also referred to in EU Regulation 
1321/2014 (1321/2014). However, the absence of any guidelines on how to establish the 
strength of a just culture or details of how to assess its presence are duly absent from the 
requirements. An embedded regulatory approach applying an ethnographic methodology 
in support of safety culture assessment could qualitatively verify the effectiveness of HF 
training in addition to formally gauging an organisation’s culture. This would need to 
examine issues around communication and trust within AMOs, as both HF are important 
for the establishment and sustainment of a healthy safety culture within organisations 
(Chatzi 2019, Chatzi et al. 2019). 
 
3.5.4 Lack of guidance on a standard approach to root-cause analysis 
Many regulations support a notion that more reporting is necessary. Reporting can be 
impeded for many reasons, such as, cultural, environmental and production pressures. 
There are pros and cons associated with increased reporting, if, however, the root causes 
are not correctly established, any additional effort by individuals may be futile. In cases 
where root cause analysis is inadequate, there is often a missed opportunity for learning. 
The EU Regulation 1321/2014 (1321/2014) does not stipulate guidance for an acceptable 
model to augment or propagate this element of learning. 
It is interesting to map these four findings against the Product-Behaviour-Process (PBP) 
model (Purton et al. 2014), examining specifically looking at the regulatory interventions. 
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The output of this exercise is illustrated in Fig. 3.2. The first observation is that the 
product segment of the PBP model, namely, any changes on the design and certification 
of aircraft and products, would not be affected. However, the behaviour and process 
segments are indeed segments where regulatory changes would be introduced. Greater 
emphasis is on behaviour aspects, as the two of the four findings are of mixed nature 




Figure 3.2. Mapping of the findings against the Product-Behaviour-Process (PBP) model 
(Purton et al. 2014) in relation to regulatory interventions. 
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3.6 Conclusions 
The review of aviation safety regulations has revealed the following:  
• A solid architecture of regulatory requirements is used by states to base their 
aviation regulatory frameworks.  
• States have developed regulations, standards and practices in support of a 
common approach to aviation safety oversight. These enable organisations to 
develop a procedural approach to regulatory compliance in concert with safe 
operations.  
• Regulatory stakeholders are aware of the tasks to be pursued so that current levels 
of safety are sustained and improved.  
• Using safety intelligence derived from an efficient occurrence reporting system is 
an efficacious means of proactively identifying latent hazards and risks in 
potentially under-performing areas. A mechanism to be applied in Europe in 
support of achieving satisfactory safety levels is performance-based oversight, 
allowing better safety oversight upon aviation segments not performing well.  
• Regulations encourage the proactive use of information in respect of lessons 
available from various sources. In addition to published accident and incident 
reports, internal data from reporting support mandatory continuation training for 
staff within AMOs and CAMOs.  
• Examination of the primary enabling legislative requirements highlights 
underperforming areas within the enabling regulatory content. This could be used 
as input to EASA regulatory rule-making development groups tasked with the 
improvement of EU Regulation 1321/2014 (1321/2014) learning capability. 
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2013. However, the intervening (July 2016) and the current issue effective date is 
November 2019. An analysis of the amending revision reveals that the changes as 
defined by ICAO; 
“Further developments of safety management provisions and extensions of safety 
management systems (SMS) provisions to organisations responsible for the type design 
and/or manufacture of engines and propellers”, has no impact on the aviation activities 
featured in this document. The first amendment to Annex 19 adopted on 2 March 2016 
(Effective 07 November 2019) completes the second phase and is based on existing 
principles with some restructuring intended to facilitate effective implementation. 
2. The status of the publication’s reference ICAO Doc 9859 is recorded as effective 
2013. However, the current issue effective date is 2018. An analysis of the amending 
revision reveals that the changes as defined by ICAO; 
To address the changes introduced by Annex 19, amendment 1 adopted on 2 March 
2016 and to reflect the knowledge and experience gained since the last revision”. 
 
These changes have no impact on the aviation activities featured in this document. 
 
Concluding statement 
This chapter offered a practical insight for safety practitioners illuminating legislative 
gaps that if addressed could improve LFI in the subject industry segment. Chapter 4 
now recounts the process of collection and analysis of data harvested from a group of 
industry participants. The study results reveal reported factors that enable and impede 
learning from incidents within the featured organisations. 
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Chapter 4. Learning from Incidents: A Qualitative Study in the 
Continuing Airworthiness Sector 
 
Abstract. 
Learning from incidents (LFI) is a useful approach when examining past events and 
developing measures to prevent ensuing recurrence. Although the reporting of incidents 
in the aircraft maintenance and continuing airworthiness domain is well appointed, it is 
often unclear how the maximum effect of safety data can be efficaciously applied in 
support of LFI in the area. From semi-structured interviews, with thirty-four participants, 
the gathered data were thematically analyzed with the support of NVivo software. This 
study establishes a relationship between an incident in its lifecycle and the learning 
process. The main aim of this work is to elucidate factors that enable LFI. The analysis 
of the data revealed, for example, the benefits of a just culture and the use of formal 
continuation training programs in this respect. Moreover, it identified limitations inherent 
in current processes such as poor event causation and poorly designed learning syllabi. 
Additionally, aspects such as a lack of regulatory requirements for competence in the 
areas of learning for managers and accountable persons currently exist. This thematic 
analysis could be used in support of organizations examining their own processes for 
learning from incidents. Additionally, it can support the development of terms of 
reference for a continuing airworthiness regulatory working group to examine, strengthen 
and better apply LFI in the aviation industry. 
 
4.1 Introduction 
If it were possible for all organizations to learn effective lessons from the past, the effects 
of future unwelcome events might be limited (Drupsteen and Hasle 2014). Aviation safety 
depends to a large extent on the efficacious efforts of all involved in the system (Chang 
and Wang 2010). Research has acknowledged the importance of event information when 
it comes to learning and preventing recurrence (Silva et al. 2017). Thankfully, major 
events such as accidents are becoming less frequent and generate less points for learning 
(Akselsson et al. 2012). In contrast, there are numerous incidents with less severe 
consequences and if appropriately considered, these could offer an earlier insight into the 
circumstances that enable unwelcome events. Predefined and relevant information 
harvested from incident reporting systems is a major element of learning and preserving 
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acceptable levels of safety. Hobbs (2002) highlights the importance of aircraft 
maintenance staff being aware of the cumulative effect of “seemingly insignificant” 
incidents as this amplifies the need to be proactive when it comes to learning from 
incidents. This research undertook a qualitative examination of staff involved in aircraft 
maintenance and continuing airworthiness operations in order to identify factors that 
could augment learning from incidents within this industry sector. 
In the areas of continuing airworthiness and aircraft maintenance, safety management 
systems include incident and occurrence reporting (1321/2014) as an obligation. It is 
common for incidents to be discovered within organizations and reported with the 
assistance of such “systems of systems” (Harvey and Stanton 2014). On an operational 
level, initial training on human factors and company procedures is intended to specify and 
re-affirm the category and type of occurrence and incident that should be reported. Recent 
developments in European Union (EU) regulations (376/2014) empower voluntary and 
confidential reporting and are independent of all other individual obligations. Detecting 
and identifying hazards highlighted through incident reporting systems is also 
recommended by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) standards and 
recommended practices as an effective means of augmenting levels of safety. However, 
Gerede (2015) strongly suggests that a failure to foster a just culture is considered to have 
a negative impact upon effective data collection (reporting), organizational learning and 
the subsequent ability to learn from incidents. 
Drupsteen and Wybo (2015) reaffirm organizations use experience gained from past 
events in order to improve safety. Effective learning can be considered as a successful 
translation of safety information into knowledge. Utilizing information from events with 
learning potential can actively improve the operating environment and help prevent 
recurrence. Learning in this context can often be experienced as modifying or 
implementing new knowledge where cultural, technical or procedural elements are 
integrated. Therefore, when learning is transformed into measures to prevent re-
occurrence, an organization often has a reasonable means of mitigating future similar 
events. Argyris and Schön (1996) highlight the importance of learning to detect and 
address effective responses to errors. Their “theory in action” concept is the focal point 
for this determination. The first of its two components, “theory in use” is one that guides 
a person’s behavior. It is often ‘tacit’ and is how people behave routinely. Very often 
these observed ‘habits’ are unknown to the specimen. The second element is known as 
“espoused theory”, namely what people say or think they do. Drupsteen and Guldenmund 
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(2014) mention that espoused theory comprises of “the words we use to convey what we 
do, or what we like others to think we do”. 
However, it is important to re-affirm the linkages that exist between individuals and 
organizational learning. The introduction of safety management systems (SMS) has 
initiated a shift in how organizational errors are viewed. Firstly, equipment has become 
increasingly more reliable, but the human form has not displayed the same response. In 
the second instance, the impact of complexities associated with an increasing cognitive 
load for staff is just beginning to be realized. The existence of a potential for blaming an 
individual is now being aligned with organizational responsibilities. Prior to this, event 
causation was often misrepresented or even over quantified the human input as 
organizational factors were not always considered. They offer an insight into the 
connection between individual actions and organizational initiatives designed to secure 
the best safety outcomes. Fogarty et al. (1999) also recognize the role that both individual 
factors have on human error and the inputs both can have on preventing recurrence. 
Doc 9859 ICAO (2013b) defines a template for aviation operators and regulators to 
support the application of a variety of proactive, predictive and reactive oversight 
methodologies. In addition to routine monitoring schemes, voluntary and mandatory 
reporting, post incident follow-up, there are also regular safety oversight audits. These 
audits and inspections often set out to establish if there is a difference between espoused 
theory and the theory in use (e.g., is the task being correctly performed in accordance 
with the documented procedure/work instruction or is there a deviation from approved 
data and practice?). However, Drupsteen and Guldenmund (2014) caution auditors not to 
“focus too much on the documentation of procedures” alone. In such cases, the oversight 
audit may be ineffective because of its sole focus on espoused theories of the organization 
only and not the theory-in-use. These authors translate this idea of poor focus on theory 
in action, into a valid learning component arising from incidents. They also highlight the 
‘espoused’ aspect where those attempting to learn from incidents often fail to experience 
the desired learning because outcomes are not fully aligned with the practical objectives 
of a learning from incidents (LFI) initiative. For learning to be most effective, espoused 
theory and theory in use should be reasonably well aligned. Ward et al. (2010) propose it 
is necessary to further develop an operational model that can account for “what is meant 
to happen and what actually happens”. 
Continuing airworthiness and aircraft maintenance and activities performed in EU 
member states are subjected to rules that mandate reporting of defined issues. 
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Repositories of reported data tend to be populated by sources that are predominantly the 
subject of mandatory reporting requirements. Conventional safety oversight models also 
only verify the presence of reporting media and repositories in this segment of the 
industry. Jacobsson et al. (2012) avow the degree of interest invested in learning from 
incidents but question its efficiency in some organizations. Although unwelcome events 
are less prevalent, less severe events still provide learning opportunities. There is often 
only a primary focus for organizations upon reporting in line with each state’s own 
reporting obligations. Unfortunately, a narrow focus on this single element of an incident 
in its lifecycle can negate the potential benefits of learning from incidents at an 
organizational level. The absence of clearly defined competency requirements 
(1321/2014) that support a pedagogy for learning from incidents for continuing 
airworthiness staff could also be considered an impediment to effective learning in the 
domain. 
The featured industry sector is regulated by the application and upkeep of numerous 
requirements in the jurisdictions of operation. In general, a costly regulatory overhead 
tends to be carried by regulating states and operators to support safe and viable activity. 
However, a growing tendency to increase regulatory requirements in pursuance of safer 
activity across the segments may not always offer the same returns as previously realized 
by states. Brunel (1841) (p.45) suggests, “…it is impossible to make men perfect: the men 
will always remain the same as they are now and no legislation will make him have more 
presence of mind…”. Furniss et al. (2016) reviewed the Hollnagel (2004) Functional 
Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM) which explores how functional variability 
resonates within systems, i.e., how well comprising elements function in a system. They 
also consider how FRAM can be modified to support complex socio technical system 
improvements. Perhaps as the paradigm supporting the linearity of regulatory oversight 
shifts, proactive regulatory inputs will also influence more effective safety outputs as 
intricacy increases. 
 
4.1.1 Systematic Literature Review 
The primary reason for conducting a systematic review was to examine how learning 
from incidents occurs in aircraft maintenance and continuing airworthiness management. 
Other sectors and the issues impacting learning in these areas were also considered. The 
literature review sets out to establish factors that contribute to or potentially constrain 
learning from incidents in the subject domain. Applying a qualitative research approach 
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is advantageous as it can provide a deeper contextual understanding of the literature and 
can assist with better research integration. The application of rigor and 
comprehensiveness can assist with advancing knowledge and identifying research gaps 
and aspects for further research in this area. Okoli and Schabram (2010) suggest “a 
dedicated methodological approach is necessary in any kind of literature review”. A 
preliminary search of literature highlighted a scarcity of best-practice guidelines for 
conducting systematic literature reviews in this area. 
Qualitative research involves handling considerable volumes of data and a degree of 
discipline is required so that search results, decisions regarding subject inclusions and 
exclusions are recorded and references are well managed. Endnote was used in support 
of the literature review during this research. An electronic database is useful for 
supporting a search strategy, arranging publications and storing references (Houghton et 
al. 2017). The qualitative data analysis software NVivo (NVivo 12, QSR International, 
Melbourne, Australia) was used to augment the data management, storage and analysis 
associated with the literature review. NVivo possesses many functions, such as 
facilitating the synthesis of a review (Bandara et al. 2015). A systematic search of in 
excess of 1000 publications was performed in the following databases: Web of Science, 
Scopus, IEEE Xplore, ProQuest and EBSCO. The following predefined search terms 
were applied: “learning from incidents”, “learning from experience”, “aircraft 
maintenance”, “aircraft management” and “safety management systems”. A practical 
screening of title and abstract was applied to each manuscript using predefined terms 
(e.g., subject, setting, publication, year). This part of the process had to be broad enough 
to create a sufficient number of applicable publications but also had to be practically 
manageable. The following criteria were implemented for the practical screening of the 
source bibliographic details, title and abstract: 
• Subject—Related to learning from incidents and past experiences. 
• Setting—Any high reliability industry or sector where learning from incidents is 
critical. 
• Publication—Journal or peer-reviewed conference proceedings. 
• Date range—published post 1992. The year 1992 was the starting point for the 
screening process, since at the time of planning the research project, 25 years was 
considered to be a reasonable timespan to include material pertaining to learning 
from incidents. 
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The output of the practical screen step produced a list of publications denoted as the 
screened set of publications. An Endnote library was then created to store and manage 
the full text of the retrieved publications. The next step involved filtering the publications 
into primary and secondary publication subsets using only primary research manuscripts 
in the next phase. Applying a set of criteria helps to reduce any researcher bias in the 
screening system. A set of inclusion and exclusion criteria (Gough 2017) was developed 
in accordance with the guidelines included in Meline (2006) and Wienen et al. (2017), 
listed in Table 4.1. Two researchers were involved in the screening process. 
 
Table 4.1. Inclusion and exclusion criteria used for the filtering of the subset of primary 
publications. 
Included Excluded 
Research studies Literature reviews 
Qualitative and mixed methods Quantitative methods 
Perceptions and experiences 
Focused on decision-making and 
legislative requirements 
Reference to just culture  
High reliability settings  
Published post 1992  
Peer reviewed publications  
Industry based settings  
Original studies  
 
The final set of 18 papers was imported into NVivo and the following analysis approach, 
as defined by Bandara et al. (2015), was used for the selection of the codification themes: 
• Deductive - themes reported on are predetermined to some extent. In this case, these 
predetermined themes were the output of a focus group process. 
• Inductive - themes reported are derived from analysis of the literature. 
NVivo is limited in terms of providing thematic classifications based on the occurrence 
of key words but can assist with identifying relationships between words and phrases 
amongst publications. It also provided thematic classifications of data based on the 
occurrence of key words and phrases. The coding process consisted of selecting relevant 
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passages of text that were captured in one or several of the framework nodes. Maykut and 
Morehouse (1994) defines a propositional statement as “a statement of fact the researcher 
tentatively proposes, based on the data”. Memos were used to draft these summary 
statements which formed part of the literature review. Central to the idea of learning is 
how an incident is generally moderated during its useful existence. Section 4.1.2 
documents this approach. 
 
4.1.2 The Notion of a Generic Incident Lifecycle 
Figure 1 illustrates how an incident tends to be managed through its quiddity. This view 
is one possible way of representing the elements comprising a lifecycle view. Cooke and 
Rohleder (2006) suggest it should also be evident that an incident system will operate 
most effectively when a safety management system has already been put in place and 
avoidable risks are addressed. They propose an effective system that addresses: 
identification and response, reporting, investigation, identifying causal structure, making 
recommendations, communicating and recalling incident learning, and implementing 
corrective actions. Drupsteen et al. (2013) also consider an incident from a learning 
perspective in its cycle. Their main constituents are investigating and analyzing incidents, 
planning interventions, intervening and evaluating (each of these four stages are further 
sub-divided into eleven sub-components). Continuing airworthiness-related incidents are 
notified by way of a formal mechanism of reporting. During the data gathering phase of 
this research, the steps outlined in Figure 4.1 were found to be dictated by regulatory 
requirements (376/2014 , 1321/2014). Once the incident enters its lifecycle, it ideally 
transverses a process that transforms the information gathered into knowledge. Figure 4.1 
and the contiguous paragraph offer an overview of how the capture and processing of the 








Figure 4.1. An example of an aviation incident lifecycle within the continuing airworthiness 
and aircraft maintenance sector. 
Continuing airworthiness-related serious incidents are rare but often due to 
environmental, cognitive and mechanical demands, reportable and unreportable events 
do occur. All organizations in the industry segment subscribe to a reporting system and 
reports can be made electronically or in paper form in smaller organizations. The main 
underpinning regulation in Europe, EU Regulation (2018/1139), refers to a management 
system and mandates an organization to implement and maintain such a system to ensure 
compliance with these essential requirements. In practice, although a reporter can report 
events directly to an aviation authority, all organizations are required to have an internal 
reporting system also. A focal point/gate keeper will process these reports either internally 
and/or inform third party stakeholders such as aviation authority or aircraft manufacturer 
as required by procedure. Depending on the event, technical management may determine 
there are immediate actions required to recover a situation or restore serviceability. While 
a small number of scenarios will require an event to be investigated fully before an aircraft 
returns to service, many incidents are investigated post event. As soon as causation is 
established, if accepted by the relevant technical function, the report is closed. This 
management system is strongly influenced by regulatory requirements and procedural 
form and is a pre-eminent influence on how an incident and its actors behave from the 
time a report is made to the time its impact has been terminated. One of the limitations 
inherent in this cycle is that lessons tend to be delivered at a later point in time mostly 
through the medium of recurrent training programs such as continuation and human 
factors training. Therefore, there is often a hiatus in the feedback cycle. However, the 
effectiveness of the process and the perceived contribution to learning are not fully 
reflected in this view. 
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4.1.3 A Potential Learning Cycle Emerges 
According to Lindberg et al. (2010), in order to prevent accidents, it is essential to learn 
from previous accidents and incidents. Lukic et al. (2012) suggest that in order to increase 
the effectiveness of learning from incidents, it is necessary to understand who should be 
included in the learning process. In Figure 4.2, the incident lifecycle is aligned with the 
learning process in order to highlight where potential improvements might be made. As 
the incident is managed and causation is established, there are potential avenues open for 
learning. The ultimate desired outcome is that adequate measures are put in place to 
prevent a recurrence of the event. However, the lessons available in a potential learning 
product are not always used to best effect when considering the Figure 4.1 process. 
Drupsteen et al. (2013) state that “many incidents occur because organizations fail to 
learn from past lessons”, because the traditional approach often stops short of preventing 
future incidents. Their research examines: investigating and analyzing incidents, planning 
and prevention, intervening and evaluating steps in a learning process. Ward et al. (2010) 
found that the resulting relationship between the individuals and the systems have a direct 
impact upon the system and prevailing environment. Silva et al. (2017) examined how 
organizations use accident information to reduce the occurrence of unwelcome events. 
Drupsteen and Wybo (2015) found that hindsight can determine if an organization did 
learn from an event but there are no models to assist with gauging the “propensity” of an 
organization to learn. Drupsteen and Hasle (2014) suggest that learning can be improved 
if limiting factors are addressed. 
The proposed enhancement (shown in Figure 4.2) to the generic lifecycle in the 
‘traditional’ approach represents a novel view and brings the learning product into focus. 
This figure highlights the benefits of ensuring the feedback loop of an incident is centered 
on the learning product. Treating its development as an iterative process ensures all steps 
in the cycle are included and where deficiencies are noted, they can be identified and 
communicated during the iterations. This can assist with delivery of timely and 
sustainable learning and help prevent an inability to think, talk and see what actions are 
proper in specific situations (Steiner 1998). According to Drupsteen et al. (2013), it is 
necessary to gain an insight into the steps of the process to identify factors that hinder 
learning in order to make improvements. The research suggests an emphasis on 
accessible, timely and appropriate learning content could provide all stakeholders in the 
process with better value for their efforts. Perhaps one reason that the customary incident 
  Page 80 of 140 
 
lifecycle and its limitations prevail is related to management theory. While innovators 
like Taylor (1911) are responsible for advances in management, such theories have not 
always fully considered safety and learning. The early 1900s witnessed a time when it 
was necessary to inaugurate efficiencies in production by initially decomposing tasks in 
order to introduce linear efficiencies. The limitations experienced in incident learning 
processes today may relate to this circumscribed tradition. 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Incident learning product and process (broken line denotes iterative learning 
feedback). 
4.2 Materials and Methods 
4.2.1. Philosophical Underpinnings 
The fields of science and philosophy consider ontology and epistemology in terms of 
What is the nature of reality? and How is human knowledge constructed? The ascendant 
ideologies of positivism and interpretivism can be applied in support of these 
philosophical differences (Weber 2004, Oates 2006). Hirschheim (1985) puts forward the 
aim of positivism to, “seek to explain and predict what happens in the social world by 
searching for irregularities and causal relationships between its constituent elements”. 
In contrast to this stance, Schwandt (1994) suggests the aim of interpretivism is to gain 
understanding. Interpretive research seeks to develop a richer understanding of the 
complex world of lived experience from the point of view of those who live in it. “This 
goal is variously spoken of as an abiding concern for the life world, for the emic point of 
view, for understanding meaning, for grasping the actor’s definition of a situation, for 
verstehen” (Schwandt 1994) (p.118). 
The intent of this qualitative study was to understand how various situations impact on 
learning from incidents in the aircraft maintenance and continuing airworthiness 
management domain by interacting with the participants on a social plane. Thus, in order 
to gain an empathetic understanding of the participants and their actions, the pursuit of 
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“verstehen” considers adopting an interpretive paragon as an approach. This approach is 
not initiated with the aid of a hypothesis intended for testing but rather using a lodestar 
that guides the researcher to a point of discovery supported with an inductive modus 
operandi. The study is unwavering in its support for the view that (individual and 
combined) qualitative and quantitative approaches possess equal value in terms of their 
investigative potential in this area of focus. In summary, the project employs a qualitative 
research methodology in an effort to generate ‘rich’ findings in support of gaining a good 
understanding of the learning environment in the featured domain. According to Maykut 
and Morehouse (1994), the purpose of qualitative research is to discover the inner world 
of perceptions and meaning making in order to gain an understanding to describe and 
explain certain social phenomenon from participants’ perspectives. In order to 
accomplish this, focus group activity was managed concurrently with the literature 
review. These activities cumulatively generated five themes which were used as the basis 
for a semi-structured interview template. The project employed a qualitative research 
methodology in an effort to generate ‘rich’ findings in support of gaining a good 
understanding of the learning environment in the featured domain. The outcome of a 
qualitative research initiative was contextual findings as opposed to broad 
generalizations. 
 
4.2.2 Focus Group 
According to Kitzinger (1994), “focus groups are group discussions organized to explore 
a specific set of issues such as people’s views and experiences…”. The idea of conducting 
group interviews is not a new one. Bogardus (1926) is an early example of a reference to 
utilizing the group interview. Frey and Fontana (1991) suggest that group interviews can 
be formally structured for a specific purpose or can be performed in a more informal 
setting where a researcher can “stimulate a group discussion”. Specific examples in the 
literature of focus groups being developed systematically within the area of aircraft 
maintenance and management are scarce. Frey and Fontana (1991) state that although 
group interviews have implicitly informed research, often they are not formally 
acknowledged as part of the process. Powell and Single (1996) remind us that when 
recruiting focus group participants, one must be mindful of systemic biases. Averting this 
was ensured by being careful to enlist the participants from different organizations and 
different positions of responsibility. Three sessions comprising of three industry 
professionals within each group were successfully moderated by the researcher. During 
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the three phases of working with the focus group, statements and terms were recorded as 
dialogue amongst the members and observed. The second meeting of the focus group 
developed four codes (safety, regulatory compliance, root cause, reporting) that had 
emerged from the group’s earlier outputs. These four codes were further distilled during 
the focus group activity and were consolidated into two themes (reporting, root cause) 
that were to eventually form part of the piloted semi-structured interview instrument. 
Reporting and root-cause themes were the result of the draft consolidation of the 
comments and emerging codes. In concert with the focus group activities, a literature 
review was performed by the researchers and this generated three further themes as 
reflected in Table 4.2. 
Table 4.2. Codification themes used in the NVivo analysis of the final set of publications. 
Codification Theme Description Origin 
Root Cause Reason to establish causation  Focus Group 
Reporting Value of reporting to learning from incidents Focus Group 
Learning from Incidents Outcomes of learning from incidents Literature Analysis 
Just culture Impact of just culture on learning from 
incidents 
Literature Analysis 




The resulting draft semi-structured template containing the five themes was scrutinized 
by the focus group. The constituent questions relating to each theme and the running order 
of the document was subject to many minor changes during the individual piloting of the 
instrument with the three group members. 
 
4.2.3 Data Collection 
Data were gathered from seven organizations using a semi-structured interview template. 
The participating organizations were involved in aircraft maintenance and continuing 
airworthiness activities. Building trust and commitment, as proffered by Chatzi (2019) 
and Chatzi et al. (2019) was deemed to be a necessary tenet of a successful data collection 
exercise. Managing the interview process with the support of senior staff complimented 
visible top-down support for the research and ensured there would be no confusion 
regarding access to what some organizations often classify as sensitive commercial data. 
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The aim was to explore how learning from incidents occurs and what can constrain 
learning in the area of focus. The pilot phase ensured the desired outcome of the main 
data collection phase would be congruent with the aims of the study. The interviews were 
recorded, transcribed and participants could not be identified from the recordings or 
transcripts. Full ethical approval for the data gathering was granted by the University. 
4.2.3.1 Instrument 
Data were collected using semi-structured interviews, lasting on average sixty minutes. 
The ‘aide memoir’ was arranged so that participants could offer a flexible response and 
any emerging themes could be identified. The semi-structured approach facilitated 
emphasis being placed upon any points that warranted further focus or examination by 
the researchers. An example of the interview template is included in figure 4.4. 
Interviewees were asked to give an example of a recent incident they were familiar with. 
The structure of the template, (a) probed process around reporting and (b) elicited the 
participants perception of learning from incidents within their organizations. Following 
on from the initial contact on reporting, the participants discussed just culture, learning, 
root-cause and incident precursors during their individual engagements with the 
researchers. 
4.2.3.2 Participants 
The “key issue in selecting and making decisions about the appropriate unit of analysis 
is to decide what it is you want to be able to say something about at the end of the study” 
(Patton 1990) (p.168). The objective of this study was to investigate individuals’ 
perceptions of how learning from incidents takes place and the obstacles present in the 
maintenance and continuing airworthiness management domain of the aviation industry 
segment. There were thirty-four (34) participants in total, as presented in Table 4.3. 
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Each of the organizations maintained between 6 and 300 aircraft at the time of the study. 
While traditional reporting and learning themes were evident outputs from the focus 
group meetings, it was decided that the data would be collected through one-to-one semi-
structured interviews. Semi-structured interviews permitted the researchers to get a 
deeper understanding of complex organizational and social interactions and at the same 
time follow a construct. The participating organizations were selected based upon them 
being accredited to perform aircraft maintenance and continuing airworthiness activities 
since the inception of EU regulation 1321/2014 (1321/2014). Within this domain, there 
are categories of staff that are required to be aware of incident reporting and make a report 
as necessary (e.g., technical managers, certifying staff, quality assurance staff, stores 
Participant Roles Number 
Category B1 Engineer 4 
Supervisor 3 
Category A Mechanic 3 
Quality Assurance Engineer 3 
Category B2 Engineer 2 
Shift Controller 2 
Contract Composite Inspector 1 
Inspector  1 
Aeronautical Engineer 1 
Category B1/B2 Engineer 1 
Maintenance Manager 1 
Technical Safety Manager 1 
Technical Services Manager 1 
Line Maintenance Manager 1 
Deputy Quality Manager 1 
Maintenance Control Manager 1 
Maintenance Planner 1 
Maintenance Safety Officer 1 
Apprentice Technician 1 
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personnel, technical services). Each organization is required under legislation to employ 
a satisfactory level of staff regardless of their aviation activities. As a minimum, at least 
one of each of these roles was represented in the study. It was ensured that at least one 
staff member from each discipline was included in the study and had made a report in the 
previous twelve months. As certifying staff, technical managers and quality assurance 
staff are by virtue of their position active reporters (due to their exposure to active 
operations), staff in these disciplines were well represented in the study’s cohort. 
Participation in the study was on a voluntary basis and all who participated were 
acquainted with the project prior to performing the interviews. All participants signed 
consent forms. 
 
4.2.4 Data Analysis 
Thematic analysis was the method chosen to support the analysis of the study’s data. The 
Braun and Clarke (2006) six-step proposition, which consists of eight discreet cycles, in 
conjunction with the QDAtraining (2013) material, formed the basis of the analysis 
technique. A practical iterative approach was adopted throughout the analysis where the 
data were formally arranged into discrete phases. The eight individual stages of analysis 
distributed over the six phases were designed to support a robust and rigorous analysis of 
the data. Table 4.5 below illustrates the stages and processes outlined and performed in 
NVivo and links this to the practical guidelines set out in Braun and Clarke (2006). Their 
six-step approach that supports the application of thematic analysis is shown in column 
one and the corresponding application in NVivo is shown in column two. The third 
column features the strategic elements of coding as the researcher moved from the initial 
participant-led descriptive coding, to the secondary coding which was more interpretative 
in nature indicating this phase of coding was both researcher- and participant-led. The 
final abstraction to themes was researcher informed only. This phase was designed to 
allow the researchers to engage the participant in direct dialogue with a wider arena such 
as literature and policy or strategy for example. The fourth and final column illustrates 
the more iterative nature of the coding, analysis and reporting of proceedings that 
terminate in a conclusion. 
Phase 1 activity involves familiarizing oneself with the transcribed data. In this first 
phase, the data were loaded into NVivo. It was checked and re-read several times to 
ensure accuracy of the uploaded transcripts. At the end of the phase activity, initial codes 
were noted down and retained. 
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Generating initial codes (open coding: phase 2)—According to Lincoln and Guba (1985) 
(p.345), a data unit can be defined as the “smallest piece of information about something 
that can stand by itself, that is, it must be interpretable in the absence of any additional 
information other than a broad understanding of the context in which the inquiry is 
carried out”. The open coding is intended to systemically organize the data and uncover 
the essential ideas found in the data (Baskerville and Pries‐Heje 2004). Each discrete unit 
of data is labelled in line with the phenomenon it represents. The second phase required 
broad participant-driven open coding of the interview transcripts recorded during the data 
gathering step of the research study. Features of interest were coded in a systematic way 
across the complete dataset where data relevant to each code were collected. Clear labels 
were allocated to these codes and definitions to serve as rules for inclusion (Maykut and 
Morehouse 1994). 
A set of provisional categories was generated for the segmented data to be coded to. These 
categories were descriptions of concepts and themes in broad terms. They took two forms: 
researcher-driven and participant-driven. The former was derived from a theoretical 
framework underpinning the study and the latter from the knowledge gained of the 
participants’ language and customs. Hammersley and Atkinson (2007) (p.153) consider 
the importance of participant-driven categories: “the actual words people use can be of 
considerable analytic importance as the ‘situated vocabularies’ employed provide 
valuable information about the way in which members of a particular culture organize 
their perceptions of the world, and so engage in the social construction of reality”. 
Searching for themes—In phase 3, codes from phase 2 were collated into categories of 
codes by structuring all the data relevant to each potential category into a framework that 
could be used in support of further analysis. This phase also included distilling, re-
labelling and merging common codes that were generated in phase 3 to ensure the labels 
and definitions for inclusion were an accurate reflection of the coded content. These first-
round categories are best described as broad descriptions of concepts and themes. During 
the analytical process they underwent content and definition change and the existence of 
the two forms of category provides an important means of traversing between “natural” 
and “theoretical” discourses. Araujo (1995) (p.68) suggests that “codes should be viewed 
in two ways: as part of the analyst’s wider theoretical framework and as grounded in the 
data.; the process of coding data should be regarded as an important intermediary step 
in translating social actors’ frames of meaning into the frame of theoretical discourse; 
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coding frames therefore, mediate between the ‘natural’ everyday discourse and the 
theoretical discourses in social science”. 
Reviewing themes (coding on) in phase 4 required further decomposition of the study 
units of data identified in phase 1. This activity was intended to support a greater 
understanding of the highly qualitative elements and gain a deeper appreciation of the 
meanings contained within. It should be noted that not every task could be further broken 
down and this meant that the activity was performed only as required. Restructured codes 
were broken down into further sub-codes in order to augment a greater understanding of 
the meanings embedded within them. These distinctive aspects included communication 
with management, discovering latent issues, just culture, learning lessons, reporting, root 
causes and story of an incident. 
Defining and naming themes in phase 5 of the data analysis was concerned with analyzing 
the tentative categories identified in phase 2 for their properties and characteristics. This 
is a pre-cursor to drafting a propositional statement for each category. Developing 
analytical memos moves the process beyond identification and description of broad 
categories to a position of analyzing and fusing meanings in the data under each category. 
This progressed to drafting a statement that aspires to illustrate the concerted meaning of 
the segments of data coded to each category. Maykut and Morehouse (1994) (p.140) 
defines a propositional statement as, “a statement of fact the researcher tentatively 
proposes, based on data”. This phase in addition to further data analysis to refine the 
specifics for each theme, generated clear definitions and a name for each theme. It also 
involved data reduction by consolidating categories from all three cycles into a more 
abstract, philosophical and literature-based thematic framework and conceptually 
mapping and exploring their relationships with one another for reporting purposes. 
Producing the report in phase 6 required analytical memos to be written against the 
higher-level themes to present an accurate summary of the content of each category and 
its codes and to also propose findings. The tasks associated with phase 6 included (i) 
generating analytical memos, (ii) testing and validating and (iii) synthesizing the memos 
coherently and cohesively and was performed simultaneously. Writing the analytical 
memos against the higher-level codes (i.e., learning from incidents, learning process and 
learning product) required an accurate summary of each category and its codes and 
findings against categories. These memos considered a few key areas: 
• The content of the cluster of codes which were being reported on. 
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• Patterns where relevant. 
• Considering background information noted against participants and examining any 
patterns relating to participants’ profiles. 
• Considering any relationship between codes and their importance in relation to the 
research questions. 
• Noting any primary sources relating to the context of the relationship with the 
literature in addition to highlighting any gaps in the literature. 
Testing, validating and revising analytical memos was performed in phase 7. The purpose 
of this was to provide a self-audit of the proposed findings by soliciting evidence in the 
data beyond just textual quotes in support of the recorded findings and to also expand on 
deeper meanings within the data. This required the data to be interrogated, not only 
relying on relationships across and between categories, but also a degree of cross 
tabulation with demographics, observations and the literature. The outcome of this phase 
was evidence-based findings as each proposed finding was validated by being rooted in 
the data themselves and was reliant on the creation of reports in support of substantiated 
findings. 
The discipline of writing analytical memos was used during the data analysis process. 
Birks et al. (2008) believe “memoing serves to assist the researcher in making conceptual 
leaps from raw data to those abstractions that explain research phenomena in the context 
of which it is examined”. In general, memos were employed at the “ideation” stage when 
the researcher was developing thought processes and early in the data capture phase. As 
decisions were made, the early processes and rationale for final analysis iterations were 
recorded using this medium. Memos were further employed to preserve an objective 
closeness to the harvested data and to maintain the context of each semi-structured 
interview at the participating individuals’ level. Developing ideas, reasons for considering 
possible category relationships and connections was also possible through the application 
of the analytical memo process. The rigorous support memoing offered served to guide 
the analysis of the data through different levels of abstraction (Miles and Huberman 
1994). The rule of this activity served to ensure a high degree of continuity between the 
outputs of ideation and the evolving interpretation that were honed through the 
researchers’ articulation, exploration and their iterations of the data. Overall, this drew 
out the meanings in the data through the increased sensitivity the researchers were offered 
by applying the memoing process (Birks et al. 2008). 
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In phase 8, the analytical memos were synthesized into a coherent and cohesive report 
with the findings well supported. The final phase involved the assembly of the narrative 
with the data extracts while appreciating the product of this amalgam in the context of the 
related literature. The example features the finding, clear links to the interview data and 
literature and an explanatory narrative in the form of a memo. This finally resulted in the 
compilation of the report which contained the results and discussion elements of the body 
of work. 
  
  Page 90 of 140 
 
Table 4.4. Stages and Process Involved in Qualitative Analysis. Adapted from Braun and 
Clarke (2006) and QDAtraining (2013) material. 
Analytical Process 
(Braun and Clarke, 
2006) [47] 
Practical application of Braun 








yourself with the 
data  
Phase 1. Transcribing data (if 
necessary), reading and re-reading 
the data, noting down initial ideas. 

















































2. Generating initial 
codes 
 
Phase 2. Open Coding: Coding 
interesting features of the data in a 
systematic fashion across the entire 
data set, collecting data relevant to 
each code 
3. Searching for 
themes 
Phase 3. Categorization of Codes: 
Collating codes into potential 
themes, gathering all data relevant to 
each potential theme 
4. Reviewing themes 
Phase 4. Coding on: Checking if the 
themes work in relation to the coded 
extracts (level 1) and the entire data 
set (level 2), generating a thematic 
“map” of the analysis 
5. Defining and 
naming themes 
Phase 5. Data Reduction: On-going 
analysis to refine the specifics of 
each theme, and the overall story 
(storylines) the analysis tells, 
generating clear definitions and 
names for each theme 
6. Producing the 
report 
Phase 6. Generating Analytical 
Memos. 
Phase 7. Testing and Validating. 
Phase 8. Synthesizing Analytical 
Memos.  
The final opportunity for analysis. 
Selection of vivid, compelling 
extract examples, final analysis of 
selected extracts, relating back of the 
analysis to the research question and 
literature, producing a scholarly 
report of the analysis [47,48] 
 
In summary, this study adopted an interpretative approach pivoting on the fact that it was 
of an exploratory nature. The study performed thirty-four interviews in eight aircraft 
maintenance and management organizations based in Ireland. An analysis of various 
potential research methods and means of data collection resulted in the following research 
design being implemented. A thematic analysis approach was employed as a research 
methodology: 
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• Unit of analysis is an individual; 
• Semi-structured interview guide was constructed following a systematic analysis 
of literature and the use of a focus group; 
• Data were collected through qualitative interviews; 
• Thirty-four interviews were collected in locations endorsed by eight 
organizations; 
• Qualitative analysis based on the guidelines from Braun and Clarke (2006) 
(thematic analysis) employing a six-phase approach was used in the study. 
 
4.3. Results and Discussion 
4.3.1 Framework 
Figure 4.3 presents a framework that offers an insight into how the present study applied 
the research inputs and produced the results. 
 
 
Figure 4.3. Research study framework. 
The top layer reflects the five themes that formed the basis for the data gathering template. 
These themes were developed through an iterative process of conducting focus group 
sessions with two themes emerging, i.e., root cause and reporting. Concurrently, a 
systematic literature review was performed using NVivo software to assist the researchers 
manage over 1000 screened publications. Following a thematic analysis of the data, three 
main themes emerged from a final cache of 18 publications, i.e., learning from incidents, 
precursors and just culture. The five themes informed the structure of a data gathering 
  Page 92 of 140 
 
instrument that supported 34 semi-structured interviews in the continuing airworthiness 
segment of the industry. Following transcription, the data were uploaded to NVivo where 
they were thematically analyzed using the Braun and Clarke (2006) framework. The 
outputs from the thematic analysis distilled the interview analysis into three main outputs, 
i.e., learning from incidents, learning process and learning product. The lower tier 
represents the elements the themes were comprised of and the findings are presented 
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Table 4.5. Summary of results. 1 Learning from incidents (LFI) is a safety management activity with a desired outcome of preventing unwelcome event 
recurrence.2 A learning process facilitates a change in knowledge and behavior intended to support LFI.3 Safety related information arising from the LFI 
process. 
Learning from incidents 1 Learning process 2 Learning product 3 
The decision to report an incident can be 
impacted by the perceived commercial pressure 
and the potential for embarrassment associated 
with making a mistake, amongst front line 
maintenance staff. 
The release of a safe aviation product is the primary goal all 
operational maintenance and management staff espouse to. 
In the organizations supporting the study, it was 
apparent that incidents are managed with the support 
of a consistent life-cycle methodology. 
Identifying and understanding organizational 
behavioural and human factors are important 
elements affecting decisions to report. 
Single-loop learning is a level of learning that can exist in a 
dynamic operational environment where a “find and fix” ethos 
exists. 
Learning products that arise from the managed 
lifecycle of an incident are intended to impart 
sufficient learning to prevent recurrence or occurrence 
of same or similar events. 
Inadequately resourced investigation and follow 
up of incidents does not support the 
determination of accurate event causation and 
measures to prevent similar incidents 
reoccurring. 
The mandatory human factors continuation training program is 
considered by study participants to be an effective enabler of 
double-loop learning. 
While aircraft manufacturers generally provide 
feedback on notified incidents, component 
manufacturers provide less feedback with little or no 
feedback arising from aviation authorities on 
submitted reports in the jurisdiction of the study. 
The recognition of the extended impact of under-
reporting on “levels of learning” is not always a 
priority in some organizations. 
Evidence amongst study participants where a review of single 
and double-loop learning within organizations was not available 
during the study. 
The cost of classroom delivered continuation training 
is a primary consideration for most organizations. 
The absence of a potential learning product that 
results from effective reporting is an impediment 
when attempting to gauge the effectiveness of 
learning. 
No formal requirement for competence in the areas of learning 
for managers and accountable persons exists in EU regulation 
1321/2014. 
Computer based training is an option that is under trial 
by some organizations but there are concerns amongst 
operational staff regarding its overall effectiveness in 
its current form. 
Pressure to prematurely close incident reports 
does not promote thorough event causation and 
measures to prevent similar incidents 
reoccurring. 
No competence requirements for staff involved in the 
development or delivery of formal human factors continuation 
training programs. 
Just culture has a positive impact on reporting rates. 
  Feedback to staff on incident causation factors from an information and learning perspective is important. 
  Poorly designed continuation training syllabi do not support effective learning. 
  Timely follow up to incident reports supports more effective learning outputs from the reporting process. 
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4.3.1.1. Learning from incidents—Acquiring, Processing and Storing data 
Incident reporting is accepted as a worthwhile activity amongst those participating in the 
study. This is based on the collective notion that the initiative raises awareness of 
incidents and potential hazards and can therefore help prevent event recurrence. The 
authors recognize that awareness is an important component of learning from incidents. 
Situations do arise where due to lack of report data, it is questionable if all the necessary 
reports are being submitted as required. Amongst the constraints to making a report are 
perceived production pressures and the potential embarrassment that could arise from 
making a mistake and highlighting it (Hobbs 2003). There are just culture concerns 
amongst some staff because they do not always know what the impact for them personally 
will be if they submit an incident report (Chatzi 2019). 
A dedicated focal point in organizations is essential for the systematic management of 
reported incidents. Where this discipline is applied, the process owner is responsible for 
highlighting reported issues and raising the necessary awareness amongst operational 
staff. Once an incident is acquired through the efforts of a reporting system, some form 
of processing and analysis is necessary. The availability of adequate resources for 
determining causation and implementing measures to prevent recurrence was identified 
as a primary point of concern. Perceived premature closure of reports was also highlighted 
amongst participants. There was a call for improved accountability and transparency on 
decisions relating to some closure actions. Respondents associate the practice of applying 
commercial key performance indicators to safety management as shallow efforts are 
sometimes made by organizations to expeditiously and prematurely close reports on 
occasion. Incident reporting and safety management initiatives have been in existence for 
some time. Large repositories of associated safety data are stored in many organizations. 
Although entities are mandated to inform key stakeholders, there is a strong opinion 
amongst some participants that the data repositories could be aggregated and put to better 
use in support of learning amongst all operators. 
 
4.3.1.2. Learning Process—Single-loop, Double-loop and Deutero-Learning 
The interview data confirms that safety is a primary underpinning value in the 
organizations that participated in the study. The release of a safe product, i.e., an aircraft 
or component, is a formative pursuit and measure of learning. In organizational 
environments where a “find and fix” ethos may prevail, single-loop learning (Argyris and 
Schön 1996) is evident in the examples presented. A desired outcome of double-loop 
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learning (Argyris and Schön 1996) is often witnessed for example through the adjustment 
of environmental, behavioral and procedural norms. Instances of double-loop learning 
can be evident following unsuccessful attempts through single-loop learning where 
causation is then adequately understood and actioned. Continuation (mandatory in-
service) training was considered by study participants as an effective mechanism that 
enables double-loop learning. During the study, it was apparent that single and double 
learning loops are recognized amongst many participants as having differing capabilities 
in terms of delivering an effective learning product. However, there was no evidence of 
formal reviews of single and double-loop learning being performed within the 
participants’ organizations. Although deutero-learning (Bateson 1972) (Argyris and 
Schön 1996) may be considered as a natural extension of other levels of learning, the 
concept did not feature strongly amongst the participants. A review of the EU regulation 
1321/2014 (1321/2014) implementing requirements confirms an absence of any 
mandatory requirement to review learning processes. 
 
4.3.1.3. Learning Product—Effectiveness and Types of Knowledge 
Continuation training is a mandated European requirement (1321/2014) for all aircraft 
maintenance and continuing airworthiness management organizations. It is a product as 
well as a medium for imparting learning from incidents and safety related hazards. It was 
identified during the study that the learning product is shared amongst staff through three 
primary means of distribution: formally delivered continuation training, tool-box talks 
and safety briefings and electronic, paper, notice board and ‘read and sign’ safety 
publications. The study suggests a learning product can arise as a result of an output from 
an incident lifecycle. Feedback from submitted occurrences to stakeholders varies from 
very good to poor. Cost is seen as a major consideration in some of the participating 
organizations when planning continuation training delivery. Although computer-based 
training is being considered in some companies as a viable option to class-room delivery, 
concerns are evident in respect of effectiveness of this medium in its current form. 
Bedwell and Salas (2010) suggest computer-based training (CBT) can be used as a 
methodology for providing, “systematic, structured learning; a useful tool when properly 
designed”. 
The perceived overburdening of operational staff with complex learning products and 
excessive cognitive loads was recorded as an impediment to learning during the study. 
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Participants suggested this can arise from poorly designed training syllabi delivered 
during periods of high operational activity. 
Four knowledge types were identified and relate to: conceptual, dispositional, procedural 
and locative knowledge forms (Thorndike 1918). One of the key objectives of learning 
from incidents is to identify the type of knowledge needed to prevent an issue recurring. 
When a reportable issue, for example, is discovered, the submitted report will identify 
“what” happened. Subsequent follow up will set out to determine “why” the issue 
occurred. The guiding principles of “how” to perform the task or operation are often 
contained in procedures or data particular to the task. The information contained in 
procedures will enable a person to utilize other forms of knowledge. Prevailing safety 
culture within an organization will have an impact on learning from incidents. If a strong 
commercial/production culture exists, this may have an impact on, for example, the depth 
and breadth of learning from incidents within the company. Induction and initial training 
are important when accessing information for new staff. Accident data repositories 
contain well-documented human factor-related examples often relating to access to 
approved data and consequently resulting in potentially preventable incidents. Examining 
the limitations of each type of knowledge when continuation training programs are being 
developed was flagged as important by some participants. During the study, no 
discernible differences were recorded in how the types of knowledge were differentiated 
in participant organizations. A review of the EU 1321/2014 (1321/2014) human factors 
syllabus requirements did not highlight a need to appreciate or account for these human 
centered limitations when designing and delivering training lessons. Improved regulatory 
guidance on the design of effective human factor related material should therefore be 
developed. Information on how training should be structured in order to appreciate types 
of knowledge and capitalize on it as a minimum are required to ensure the most 
efficacious outcome from incident-related training. 
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4.4. Conclusions 
An ameliorating feature of learning from incidents is the potential to effect sustainable 
improvements in aviation safety. A review of safety from the perspective of maintenance 
and continuing airworthiness staff is key to understanding the relationship between safety 
and the concept of learning from incidents (Lukic et al. 2012). From the study’s 
qualitative data, we were able to identify how learning occurs in the airworthiness 
segment, and issues that support and constrain learning. Recurrent mandated training 
initiatives such as continuation training were found to be pivotal in enabling learning. 
Aspects such as prevailing culture and poor event causation were noted to have a negative 
impact on learning. Our proposed incident learning process (Figure 4.2) offers a 
panoramic of where potential learning opportunities and procedural improvements can 
arise within the lifecycle of an incident. This perspective could be applied in support of 
developing regulatory working group specifications and validating continuation training 
initiatives. In addition, it could also be used to develop a holistic review approach to 
learning from incidents within other organizations both in the aviation industry and 
outside. Two notable limitations to our research arise. First, the scarcity of prior studies 
capable of supporting the basis for the research was pronounced. However, prior studies 
in parallel domains were successfully leveraged in support of the literature review. 
Second, the study’s population (n = 34) was relatively small. As the study participants 
were representative of all affected domain functions and a point of saturation was reached, 
it was deemed adequate. This research is capable of supporting other papers on additional 
benefits associated with learning from incidents (LFI). Notably, with the imminent 
implementation of a safety management (SMS) requirement for continuing airworthiness 
organizations, potential improvements to hazard identification arising from learning from 
incidents (LFI) could be highlighted. 
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Concluding statement 
This chapter identified potential organizational and regulatory LFI short-comings evident 
in the participating organizations. Chapter 5 presents an analysis of a sample of 15 
reported occurrences and aligns the output with a known learning taxonomy. A novel 
learning archetype with a focus on the ‘learning product’ is introduced. 
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Semi-structured interview template. 
 
a. Reporting 
• Could you describe an occurrence/incident that happened recently? 
• How is a report made? 
• Who decides what events to report? 
• Where does the requirement to report come from? 
• How is the importance of reporting highlighted in the organisation? 
• What do you think the aim of reporting is? 
• Have you received feedback from reports you have submitted? 
b. Just culture 
• Do you think there is a good safety culture in the organisation? 
• Why is this? 
• Is it easy to communicate with management on safety issues? 
• Do you feel a just culture exists in the company? (Why is that?) 
• How does just culture impact on reporting? 
c. Learning 
• How are lessons that arise from occurrence/incident reporting delivered to staff in your 
area?  
• How is learning achieved?  (What is the process?) 
• What obstacles to learning from incidents have you experienced in your position? 
• In your opinion, what conditions or developments could improve learning from 
incidents/occurrences in your organisation? 
 
d. Root cause 
• What is your opinion on efforts to establish a single root cause when an 
incident/occurrence is investigated? 
• Is this approach always effective? 
• What situations have you experienced where incident causes can be numerous and 
complex? 
 
e. Occurrence/incident pre-cursors 
• How important is it to identify and report events not required by the mandatory 
occurrence reporting (MOR) schemes? (Why is this?) 
• Is the organisation’s occurrence/ incident reporting system capable of managing reports 
other than MOR’s? 
• Is there a better way of gathering and using the potential information from non-
mandatory events? (What would you suggest?) 
 
Figure 4.4. Semi-structured interview template.  
Code 1 Code 2 Previous positions Years in previous positions 
Position Years in position Qualification Type of organisation 
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Preamble and Statement of Author’s Contribution Chapter 5 
Chapter 5 presents the results of the analysis of 15 selected incidents and maps the outputs 
against a recognized taxonomy. Additionally, the papers introduces a novel approach to 
learning from incidents that is learning product centric. 
 
Author Contributions: Conceptualization, J.C. and K.I.K.; methodology, J.C.; formal 
analysis, J.C.; investigation, J.C.; validation, J.C and K.I.K.; data curation, J.C.; writing—
original draft preparation, J.C. and K.I.K.; writing—review and editing, J.C. and K.I.K. 
All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript. 
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Chapter 5. Analysis of Continuing Airworthiness Occurrences 
under the Prism of a Learning Framework 
 
Abstract.  
In this research paper fifteen mandatory occurrence reports are analyzed. The purpose of 
this is to highlight the learning potential incidents such as these may possess for 
organizations involved in aircraft maintenance and continuing airworthiness management 
activities. The outputs from the mandatory occurrence reports are aligned in tabular form 
for ease of inclusion in human factors’ continuation training material. A new incident 
learning archetype is also introduced, which intends to represent how reported incidents 
can be managed and translated into lessons in support of preventing event recurrence. 
This ‘learning product’ centric model visually articulates activities such as capturing the 
reported information, establishing causation and the iterative nature of developing a 
learning product.  
 
Keywords: aircraft maintenance; airworthiness; learning from incidents; aviation safety; 
learning taxonomy 
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5.1 Introduction 
Structured and continuous safety management actions, such as collection of data, analysis 
and intervention can be enabled with the support of the necessary safety intelligence. High 
quality maintenance and management tasks are some of the essential inputs for safe 
operations. Continuous information ‘harvested’ from incident reporting arising from 
these tasks, is another major part of learning and preserving acceptable levels of safety 
(Silva et al. 2017). Thankfully, serious incidents are becoming less frequent (Akselsson 
et al. 2012) but often because of environmental, cognitive and human centric demands, 
reportable and unreportable events do occur. The main underpinning aviation regulation 
in Europe, European Union (EU) regulation 2018/1139 (2018/1139) refers to 
“management system” and mandates an operator to implement and maintain a 
management system to ensure compliance with these essential requirements for safe 
operations; it also aims for continuous improvement of the safety system through learning 
from incidents. 
In the area of continuing airworthiness, the fundamentals of management systems are also 
extended to incident and occurrence reporting through the implementing conduit of EU 
regulation 1321/2014 (1321/2014). It is common for incidents to be discovered within 
organizations and reported with the assistance of such ‘systems of systems’ (Stanton and 
Harvey 2017). On an operational level, initial human factors training, and company 
procedures are intended to specify and re-affirm the class and type of occurrence and 
incident that should be reported. Recent developments in Europe in the guise of EU 
regulation 376/2014 (376/2014) empower voluntary and confidential reporting and are 
independent of all other individual obligations. The paper recounts an analysis of 15 
occurrences drawn from a repository of reportable incidents. Each incident was assessed, 
and the report data interpreted to support potential primary and secondary causation 
factors. To translate these learning points into tangible lessons, causation factors are 
harmonized with a taxonomy for learning. This taxonomy is based upon the Transport 
Canada ‘Dirty Dozen’ (Transport Canada 2003) human factors terms which feature 
common aviation human error preconditions. Additionally, a framework is presented in 
the paper to demonstrate how learning from incidents can be leveraged with best effect 
in the industry segment. Mandatory reportable incidents are notified through the formal 
mechanism of reporting. Once the incident enters its lifecycle, it ideally transverses a 
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process that transforms the information gathered into knowledge. This knowledge is 
intended to assist with the prevention of similar future events. 
 
5.2. Safety Reporting Background 
5.2.1 International and European Regulatory Context 
Safety information databases containing appropriate details of events with potential and 
latent ancillary contributors are available and can be considered with the assistance of 
continuous analysis. In the United States a combined effort by the aviation industry, 
organizations and individuals, known as the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) 
(FAA 2015) collect reports that are submitted on a voluntary basis. The outputs from this 
initiative set out to identify system deficiencies and raises correspondence directly with 
the responsible people. The intention is to affect learning and improvements that correlate 
with corrective actions that avert event recurrence. 
On a wider scale through the diligent offices of the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO), standards and recommended practices that define contracting state 
reporting and analysis obligations, have been developed as a result of the collective efforts 
of participating states. For example, Annex 13 Aircraft Accident Investigation (ICAO 
2010) to the Chicago Convention (ICAO 1944) defines the standards that require states 
to report accidents involving aircraft with a maximum take-off weight (MTOW) of 2250 
kg and above. The document also contains details of reportable incidents (MTOW 5700 
kg) that are considered important in terms of safety and accident prevention. An 
accident/incident data reporting system (ADREP) is operated and managed by ICAO. 
Safety data from (ICAO) member states are received, verified and retained in the ADREP 
system. The repository contains an aggregate of occurrences/incidents/accidents reported 
by the contracting states. The Accident/Incident Reporting Manual (ICAO 2014) 
document defines the report content, its composition and means of transmittal to ICAO. 
A common group of general codes known as a taxonomy is used to standardize the inputs 
for reporting. In an effort to improve harmonization and exchange of information, most 
European aviation competent authorities have already migrated to the ICAO common 
ADREP taxonomy. 
The EU, in recognition of its duty of care to the travelling public acknowledges that it 
must continue to improve levels of aviation safety. Based on a global expectation (Boeing 
2015) of the imminent increase in aviation activity, significant challenges are evident if 
EU is to only preserve current levels of safety. Presently, air passengers enjoy the benefits 
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of a safe industry based on the technological advancements, recognition of human 
performance and limitations, compliance primarily with prescriptive regulations and the 
learning potential arising from past accidents and incidents. The EU regulation 376/2014 
(376/2014) was developed to enable the collection, analysis, and follow-up of reportable 
incidents and occurrences. It mandates provisions for reporters to submit mandatory 
occurrence reports (MOR’s) and voluntary occurrence reports (VOR’s). There are 
discriminating conditions that must be met in order to determine which ‘conduit’ is 
required to report a hazard or incident. The regulation also defines reporting timelines for 
initial reporting (within 72 h of discovery) and for reporting to the competent authority 
(within a further 72 h). Organizations are also required to have a process in place to 
implement timely follow-up and notification of their analysis to their competent authority. 
In Europe, reporting entities are encouraged to submit reports through a reporting portal 
moderated by the European aviation safety agency (EASA). Civil aviation competent 
authorities have access to the portal and the incidents and accidents are categorized in 
accordance with a standard aviation data reporting program (ADREP) taxonomy. They 
are then uploaded to a European coordination for accident and incident reporting systems 
database (ECCAIRS). This multi-modal European transport database can facilitate the 
collection, analysis and sharing of transport safety data. 
 
5.2.2 Learning from Incidents: Underpinning Theory 
According to Leveson (2004), a holistic view of an organization’s capability in terms of 
learning from incidents can be enhanced by shifting the focus from the individual to what 
is happening across the system. In the world of ‘operational aviation’ the concept of 
Safety Management Systems (SMS) has been for the most part successfully embraced 
and applied where mandated. Deming (2000) the respected purveyor of quality assurance 
methodologies asks the question, “what is a system?”  He continues to answer, “a system 
is a network of interdependent components that work together to try to accomplish the 
aim of the system”. This description of the system suggests that the process (in safety 
management parlance) is “a network of interdependent components”. Safety management 
philosophy requires specific points to be formally addressed so that the safety 
management process of operational risk can be explicitly expressed and therefore 
effectively managed. One of these points is preventing the recurrence of incidents and 
occurrences through learning from past events to achieve an acceptable level of safety.  
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Today, in many jurisdictions it is a requirement for aircraft maintenance and continuing 
airworthiness management organizations to maintain an occurrence-reporting system. 
European regulatory requirements (376/2014) and organization procedures (1321/2014) 
normally require the event to be investigated, documented and the causal factors 
considered. Additionally, corrective and/or immediate actions are often necessary to 
prevent re-occurrence. Learning from these incidents can often provide potential 
solutions to preventing safety crises in the future by looking back at what has happened 
and deriving lessons learned and predicting probable future challenges, (Bond 2002). 
‘Learning from incidents’ (LFI) is a valuable tool in many domains. Much research has 
been devoted to understanding how this process can be expressed and measured, how 
worthwhile lessons can be learned through more efficient and effective learning, as 
proffered by Drupsteen and Guldenmund (2014), Hovden et al. (2011) and Jacobsson et 
al. (2011). A main tenet of this reporting system is the ability to report any error or 
potential error in a ‘free and frank’ way. This philosophy is intended to be supported by 
what is termed a just culture, where the outcome for the individual is not based on punitive 
measures or being inappropriately punished for reporting or co-operating with occurrence 
investigations. The occurrence reporting system is also intended to be a ‘closed-loop’ 
system where feedback is given to the originator and effective actions are implemented 
within the organization to address the embryonic or evident safety hazards. The concept 
is progressive in terms of its potential for contribution to identifying and addressing less 
than optimal performance of human, organizational and technical systems. Understanding 
that adverse and unwelcome events can be minimized through diligent reporting, event 
analysis and learning and subsequent necessary intervention is a positive trait with respect 
to improving acceptable levels of safety. 
Argyris and Schön (1996) (pp. 20–21) highlight the importance of learning to detect and 
address effective responses to errors. Their ‘theory in action’ concept is the focal point 
for this determination. The first of its two components, ‘theory in use’ is one that guides 
a person’s behavior. This is often only expressed in tacit form and is how people behave 
routinely. Very often these observed habits are unknown to the individual. The second 
element is known as ‘espoused theory’, namely what people say or think they do. 
Drupsteen and Guldenmund (2014) mention that espoused theory comprises of “the 
words we use to convey what we do, or what we like others to think we do”.  
Enabling this learning channel, ICAO Doc 9859 (ICAO 2013b) defines a template for 
aviation operators and regulators to support the application of a variety of proactive, 
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predictive and reactive oversight methodologies. In addition to routine monitoring 
schemes, voluntary and mandatory reporting, post incident follow-up; there are regular 
safety oversight audits. These audits and inspections often set out to establish if there is a 
difference between espoused theory and the theory in use, e.g., is the task being correctly 
performed in accordance with the documented procedure/work instruction or is there a 
deviation from approved data and practice? However, Drupsteen and Guldenmund (2014) 
caution auditors not to “focus too much on the documentation of procedures” alone. In 
such cases the audit oversight may be ineffective because of its sole focus on espoused 
theories of the organization only and not the theory-in-use. They progress to translate this 
idea of poor focus on theory in action and recommend a solution by suggesting a valid 
learning component arising from the incidents. They also highlight the ‘espoused’ aspect 
where those attempting to learn from incidents often fail to experience the desired 
learning because outcomes are not fully aligned with the practical objectives of an LFI 
initiative. For learning to be most effective, espoused theory and theory in use should be 
reasonably well aligned. 
Aircraft maintenance and continuing airworthiness management activities that are 
performed in European member states are moderated by rules that mandate reporting of 
defined incidents and occurrences. Repositories of reported data tend to be populated only 
from sources predominantly aligned with mandatory incident/occurrence reporting 
requirements. Conventional safety oversight models only verify the presence of reporting 
media and repositories in this segment of the industry. Traditionally there has been a focus 
amongst organizations to ensure details of reports are submitted in line with state’s 
mandatory reporting obligations. However, it is possible such a narrow focus on a single 
element (i.e., reporting alone) of an incident in its lifecycle could negate the potential 
learning benefits that might accrue from considering other likely related sources. As a 
result, the absence of clear regulatory requirements capable of augmenting learning from 
incidents could be considered an impediment to effective learning in the domains affected 
by EU regulation 1321/2014 (1321/2014). The featured industry sector is regulated by 
the application and upkeep of numerous requirements in each jurisdictions of operation. 
In general, oversight duties tend to be carried by regulating states and operators in support 
of safe and profitable activity. However, a growing tendency to just increase some 
regulatory requirements across the segments may not always offer the same safety returns 
necessary for states in the future. 
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Up until some years ago, basic risk mitigation methods had remained unchanged. The 
previously reactive initiatives had largely been based on post-event analysis of accidents 
and incidents. At present, learning from past incidents, occurrences and accidents must 
be credited with playing a major part in helping evolve the paradigm to the more proactive 
means of risk management in many aviation segments we know today. Accident models 
(Heinrich and Reason) can sometimes inadvertently contribute to an over-simplification 
of how accident and incident contributing factors are perceived. This can result in striving 
to establish a singular root cause. Understandably the propensity for those tasked with 
accident and incident investigation is sometimes to establish a linear view based only on 
apparent causal factors. Proactively identifying precursors to events or potential 
conditions can greatly assist in averting latent or undiscovered conditions. Since the early 
1990s, the potential for organisations to learn from incident precursors and conditions has 
been worthy of attention. Cooke (2003) endorses a suggestion that increased reporting of 
incidents enhances continuous improvements in high reliability industries. In the 
continuing airworthiness segment of the industry, here is often a regulatory driven focus 
on establishing a single root cause. The importance of adequate resources and efforts to 
determine accurate incident causation and the measures to prevent reoccurrence should 
be a primary concern. Until ED 2020/002/R (2020/002/R 2020) is fully implemented, it 
is possible that the custodians of current regulatory requirements are satisfied once a root 
cause is established. Could it be that the current popular practice of pursuing (singular) 
root cause focus can be a lost opportunity when additional related sources exist?  
The harvesting of information from incident reporting systems is a necessary input to 
continuously develop appropriate and effective recurrent training material. The inclusion 
of basic qualification criteria for human factor trainers in the regulatory requirements 
should also be addressed. However, it is questionable if the perpetuation of these 
measures alone would support more effective delivery and application of lessons learned 
throughout the segment. One means of addressing this impending issue is to remodel 
regulatory, operational and training requirements to consider a new approach in the 
segment. Reflecting a combination of actions, events and conditions in a new basic model 
supporting human factor continuation training, may lay the foundations to better elucidate 
event causation and yield improved and sustainable safety recommendations in the 
featured segment. 
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5.3. A Model Supporting Learning from Incidents 
5.3.1 Model Design and Description 
Currently European measured levels of aviation safety are generally considered as 
acceptable. As domain activity is expected to increase in the coming decades, further 
steps to improve or at least preserve contemporaneous levels of safety will have to 
continue to be developed. One of the main facets of safety management is the reporting, 
collection, analysis and to Annex 19 (ICAO 2013a). This is also highlighted in an EU 
communication COM/2011/0670 (COM/2011/0670 2011) and (EU) 376/2014 
(376/2014) . A primary reason for the emphasis on reporting and subsequent learning 
from incidents (LFI) is to enable and support a shift from prescribed safety oversight to a 
risk-based programme. This is seen as the best fit to enable and effect improvements in 
areas that will present the most risk (Cooke and Rohleder 2006). Figure 5.1 presents one 
view of a generic incident lifecycle (Drupsteen et al. 2013) integrated with an interactive 
framework arising from the researchers work. This ‘proposed enhancement’ could 
augment a learning dimension in the cycle of an incident. 
 
 
Figure 5.1. Incident learning product and process (Broken line denotes iterative learning 
feedback). 
 
Figure 5.1 also illustrates a view of the overall process employed to acquire, process and 
store incident data. The ‘broken line’ arrows signify an iterative action at each stage of 
processing the incident. The purpose of this is to ask and record what can be learned at 
each point? The motif of how a learning product originates from the regulatory 
perspective is also featured. The effectiveness of the learning from the event is considered 
in terms of how This is evident from feedback originating from the actions in the cycle 
when the learning product is being developed. Closing the learning loop is also necessary 
and reflected in graphic form. In addition to this, assessing actions at each incident stage 
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is intended to support an analysis of how effective resulting actions are in terms of 
preventing recurrence of the incident. Actions to prevent the recurrence of the same or 
similar events can be embodied as a result of how effective the learning was. As such the 
novelty of this framework exists in its clear visual representation rather than the actual 
arrangement of the specific stages recorded. Traditionally the industry focus on incidents 
and occurrences has pivoted solely around the reporting requirements. These obligations 
are the backdrop against which mandatory reporting activity takes place. The 
establishment of causation is required by regulatory process but little or no suitability of 
same is mandated by requirement in support of any potential for learning. The featured 
framework serves to present the main elements of an incident during its lifecycle and 
highlight the aspects to be considered when incidents are being used in support of 
developing effective safety lesson delivery. 
 
5.3.2 Model Implementation 
The area of focus for this paper is aircraft maintenance and continuing airworthiness 
management (1321/2014) activities. It was decided to establish contact with an Irish 
Aviation Authority (IAA) European central repository for aviation accident and incident 
reports (ECCAIRS) focal point. Following a briefing, a specific permission was granted 
to review a data set of deidentified mandatory occurrence reports (MOR’s) for the purpose 
of academic analysis. The operational theatre of activity involved licensed air carriers 
operating large aircraft on the Irish civil aircraft register. The permission allowed an 
initial physical database search to be performed from June 2019 to November 2019 using 
‘Part 145 (maintenance) and Part M (continuing airworthiness management)’ as the 
search terms for de-identified report content. Approximately 200 results came back. The 
narrative and content of each report was reviewed by the researchers for applicability to 
the analysis. This exercise refined the reports under review to a data set of 85. Figure 5.2 
presents an overview of the analysis framework, (IAA) European central repository for 
aviation accident and incident reports (ECCAIRS) focal point. Following a briefing, a 
specific permission was granted to review a data set of deidentified mandatory occurrence 
reports (MOR’s) for the purpose of academic analysis. The operational theatre of activity 
involved licensed air carriers operating large aircraft on the Irish civil aircraft register. 
The permission allowed an initial physical database search to be performed from June 
2019 to November 2019 using ‘Part 145 (maintenance) and Part M (continuing 
airworthiness management)’ as the search terms for de-identified report content. 
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Approximately 200 results came back. The narrative and content of each report was 
reviewed by the researchers for applicability to the analysis. This exercise refined the 
reports under review to a data set of 85. Figure 5.2 presents an overview of the analysis 




Figure 5.2. Overview of the analysis framework applied. The systematic review phases 
(identification-screening-eligibility-outcome) follow the methodology of Liberati et al. (2009). 
 
5.3.3 Model Validation: Report Causal Elements 
A third round of full read screening of the set yielded 15 deidentified reports applicable 
to the exercise topic. Each featured event was considered under the following elements: 
the actual event, maintenance phase detected and likely potential causation factors. Table 
5.1 contains an overview of this analysis output. Each of the 15 analysed occurrence 
reports provided a description of the featured event and some were helpfully 
contextualised with a chronological timeline when included in the report body. This later 
assisted with appreciating all the potential causation elements for each event. However, 
the reported verbiage tended to terminate mostly with a focus on consequential impact 
rather than causal information. For the sake of consistency across the analysis, the authors 
decided to apply a systematic approach to elicit and validate causal factors from the data. 
The process was based on a clear definition of root cause as proffered by Paradies and 
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Busch (1988) as: ‘the most basic cause that can be reasonably identified and the 
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Table 5.1. Results of the analysis of 15 incidents and mapping against the ‘Dirty Dozen’. 
 
 Potential causation factors for each analysed 
incident 
Dirty dozen ‘taxonomy’ 
  Primary Secondary 
1. Incorrect tooling 
Competence for task 
Task sequencing 
Lack of resources  
Lack of knowledge 
(Knowledge, skills, ability) 
Complacency 
Lack of awareness 
Norms established  
Lack of communication 
Lack of assertiveness 
 
 
2. Continuing airworthiness management 
organisation (CAMO) management system 
competence 
Production pressure 
Lack of knowledge 
(procedures & knowledge, 
skills, ability) 
Lack of communication 
Pressure 
Lack of resources 
Stress 
Fatigue/Stress/Distraction 
3. Inadequate aircraft maintenance programme 
(AMP) inspection task 
Product design 
Norms established 
Lack of communication 
Lack of awareness 
Lack of resources 
4. Inadvertent damage 
Incorrect gauge of locking wire & locking 
technique 
Distraction 
Lack of knowledge 
(Knowledge, skills, ability) 
Fatigue 
Lack of teamwork 
Complacency 
Lack of awareness 
5. CAMO work request incorrect 
Maintenance procedure not followed 
Lack of knowledge 
(Knowledge, skills, ability) 
Pressure 
Lack of assertiveness 
Norms established 
Lack of resources 
6. Procedure design 
Production pressure 
Competence for task 
CAMO management system competence 
Lack of knowledge 
Pressure 
Lack of awareness 
Lack of communication 
Lack of resources  
Fatigue/Stress/Distraction 
Lack of supervision 
7. Production pressure 
Competence for maintenance task 
Pressure 
Lack of knowledge 
(Knowledge, skills, ability) 
Fatigue/Stress/Distraction 
Lack of resources 
8. Maintenance data availability 
Production pressure 
Competence for task 
Lack of resources 




Lack of awareness 
9. Procedure design 
Production pressure 
Supervision 
Competence for maintenance task 
Lack of knowledge 
(Procedures) 
Pressure 
Lack of knowledge 
(Knowledge, skills, ability) 
Lack of awareness 
Lack of communication 
Complacency 
Lack of assertiveness 
10. Incorrect tooling 
Competence for maintenance task 
Task sequencing 
Lack of knowledge 
Lack of awareness 
Lack of communication 
Norms 
Lack of resources 
11. Maintenance data 
Procedure design 
Production pressure 
Competence for maintenance task 
Post task leak-check 
Lack of knowledge 
(Knowledge, skills, ability) 
Pressure 
Lack of awareness 
Lack of teamwork 
Complacency 
Fatigue/Stress/Distraction 
Lack of resources 
12. Production pressure 
Competence for maintenance task 
Maintenance data availability 
Supervision 
Pressure 
Lack of knowledge 
Lack of teamwork 
Fatigue/Stress/Distraction 
Lack of resources 
13. Competence for maintenance task 
Production pressure 







Norms established  
Lack of resources 
Lack of knowledge 
(Knowledge, skills, ability) 
Lack of awareness 
Complacency 
Lack of communication 
15. CAMO procedure competence 
Culture 
Supervision 
Lack of knowledge 
(Knowledge, skills, ability) 
Norms 
Stress 
Lack of awareness 
Lack of resources 
Pressure 
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Many analysis tools [e.g., Fault tree analysis (FTA), functional resonance analysis model 
(FRAM), systems theoretic accident model and process (STAMP), sequentially timed 
events plotting (STEP)] are available and can be applied in support of a systematic review 
aimed at establishing causal factors. However, each of the aforementioned is generally 
applied in support of more voluminous operational applications and a degree of 
familiarity and adequate resources are usually required to ensure an efficacious outcome. 
As the incident reports (n = 15) under review already had causal factors ascribed, the 
authors deemed a simple analysis tool to be appropriate. According to Card (2017), the 
‘5 Why’s technique’ is a widely used technique applied in support of root cause analysis 
and is used by many statutory organisations globally. Ohno (1988) (p. 123) highlights 
that by repeating why five times, the nature of the problem as well as its solution becomes 
clear. As the authors of this paper were aware, sole reliance on a tool like the 5 Why’s 
has limitations. In particular, exclusive operational reliance on its prowess as a revealing 
panacea could inveigle its users in to over-simplifying an event and thereby be seduced 
into pursuing an inappropriate singular cause. As a result, the tool was applied solely as 




Each mandatory occurrence report (MOR) was thoroughly reviewed, and the content of 
the event and related actions carefully assessed. However, without an intimate knowledge 
of the operational environment, history of the aircraft reliability and related operational 
dynamic and contextual influences for example, it was not possible to definitively 
establish if the recorded causation and related factors were indisputably accurate for each 
event. Notwithstanding the foregoing, based on the authors experience and judgement the 
recorded causation factors were harmonised with a taxonomy derived from the elements 
of the Transport Canada (2003) ‘dirty dozen’ terms associated with common error 
preconditions. The elements are generally identified as, Lack of communication, 
Distraction, Lack of resources, Stress, Complacency, Lack of teamwork, Pressure, Lack 
of awareness, Lack of knowledge, Fatigue, Lack of assertiveness, Norms. The purpose of 
aligning the ‘potential incident causation factors’ with a known taxonomy is to assist with 
developing clear learning product content and learning objectives. Regulatory code or 
guidelines for the continuing airworthiness domain do not require a formal approach to 
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learning such as those defined by Bloom (1956) and Anderson and Sosniak (1994). 
Although the reports featured display similar activity profiles, recognition for the need to 
consider learning taxonomies and the importance of domains of learning (cognitive, 
affective and psychomotor) when designing continuation training programmes is 
considered essential. In addition, organisations are not required to have a formal 
mechanism of assessing efficacy, instead many take comfort in national, European and 
international holistic safety reports as a means of gauging their performance as part of the 
collective. 
Assuming the purpose of learning objectives is to assist with the delivery and 
measurement of the effectiveness of learning actions, developing an overview of a 
harmonised taxonomy is helpful in this regard. In Table 5.1 above, potential causation 
factors for each of the 15 selected incidents were matched with the twelve elements of 
the ‘Dirty Dozen’ human factor taxonomy. In order to prevent an over-simplification of 
each event’s contributing factors, the authors were careful not to be seduced into seeking 
a singular root cause. Therefore, it was decided to include both primary and secondary 
human factor elements so that causation could be considered in a holistic manner. The 
following paragraphs (a–h) and Figure 5.3 give a breakdown of the issues emerging from 
the assessment of the mandatory occurrence reports (MOR’s) as seen through the lens of 
association with a taxonomy. 
a. Lack of knowledge features as a primary element in 13 (87%) of 15 occurrences. 
This can be closely related to the competence required to perform the task as it 
relates to aircraft maintenance and continuing airworthiness management 
activities which are defined as comprising of ‘knowledge, skills and 
attitude/ability’ (1321/2014). As a secondary potential contributing element, it 
relates to only 1 (7%) of the 15 occurrences.  
b. Lack of awareness is highlighted as a primary potential causation factor in 9 (60%) 
of the 15 reviewed occurrences. This element can be closely related to 
competence, communication and teamwork. As a secondary contributing factor, 
lack of awareness was noted during the review in 5 (33%) of 15 reviewed 
occurrences. 
c. Lack of resources were recorded in 3 (20%) of 15 events. Adequate resources are 
required in order for an operator to adequately staff an organisation so that an 
aircraft can be maintained to the correct standard and when required. EU 
1321/2014 (1321/2014) mandates that a manpower plan is maintained in support 
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of ensuring adequate levels of staff are consistently available. As a secondary 
issue, lack of resources appeared as an issue in 5 (33%) of 15 cases. Ultimately, 
accountable managers are the key to ensuring sufficient resources are made 
available so that the organisational elements continue to remain compliant and 
effective in this respect. 
d. Norms accounted for 3 (20%) of 15 reports examined. Norms are often viewed as 
behaviours that are developed and accepted within a group. However, when the 
resulting behaviour requires a deviation from approved procedural function, the 
consequences are often unknown. Although such actions may offer short-term 
productivity gains, they may also introduce active and latent safety hazards. In the 
case of secondary causation, norms are associated with 8 (53%) of 15 assessed 
occurrences. 
e. Lack of communication was found to be evident in 3 (20%) of 15 occurrences in 
the study. Communication in aircraft maintenance and management activities is a 
vital element in the release of a safe product. Poor communication can amplify 
many other elements of the human factors leading to a deterioration in human 
performance, (Chatzi 2019), (Chatzi et al. 2019). 2 (13%) of the 15 reviewed 
communication-related occurrences were recorded as contributing to secondary 
event causation. 
f. Complacency was revealed as a primary factor in the causation of 1 (7%) of 15 
events studied. However, as a secondary contributing factor it accounted for 5 
(33%) of 15 reports. Stress levels associated with a task can diminish performance 
if one becomes complacent. Its presence can contribute in concert with other 
elements capable of setting the scene for an unwelcome event. 
g. Stress as a primary factor appeared in 1 (7%) of the 15 reviewed events. However, 
it was associated with 2 (13%) of 15 reports as a secondary issue. Stress can be 
both a by-product and an enabler of other Dirty Dozen elements. Fatigue for 
example can be closely coupled to stress and displayed similar pattern in the study 
with 7% and 13% respectively of prevalence in the reports reviewed. 
h. Lack of assertiveness was evident as a primary and as a secondary causation factor 
in both cases and occurring at rate of 1 (7%) of 15 events under review. Distraction 
and lack of teamwork appeared in similar proportions in the review results. 
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Recalling the causal factors attributed to the featured occurrence reports in the paragraphs 
above, it is easy to appreciate their relationships with the ‘Dirty Dozen’ example of human 
factor elements. For example, lack of resources can be a major constraint when it comes 
to providing adequate levels of appropriately qualified competent staff. Pressures exerted 
upon staff in a dynamic industry sector to absorb additional workload can of course have 
a potentially detrimental effect on safe operations. Competent and available supervision 
of maintenance and inspection staff is a core requirement of a quality mission in aircraft 
maintenance and continuing airworthiness management operations. In many regions the 
maintenance requirements [e.g., EU regulation 1321/2014 (1321/2014)] stipulate a 
process whereby all staff must meet the qualification criteria and be deemed competent 
before unaccompanied work can take place. For the purpose of the discussion, key 
elements of the incident cycle components are examined through pertinent elements 
identified during the analysis. The iterative approach suggested during the management 
of the incident information is supported by the context outlined below. Understanding the 
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The following paragraphs discuss the incident cycle from the perspective of developing 
a sound learning product. 
 
5.5.1. Acquiring, Processing and Storing Incident Data 
According to Garvin (1993), a clear definition of learning has proven to be elusive over 
the years. Garvin suggests “a learning organization is an organization skilled at creating, 
acquiring and transferring knowledge and at modifying its behaviour to reflect new 
knowledge and insights”. Figure 5.1 illustrates the evolution of an incident as it is 
managed through its cycle. The incident/occurrence will need to be detected if it is to 
possess any potential for learning. Acquiring information in support of learning is one of 
the key actions. Such learning material originates from compliance audits, amended 
regulatory requirements, best practice, and incidents and occurrence reports. Within the 
greater area of aircraft maintenance and continuing airworthiness management, details of 
incidents and occurrences tend to be reported soon after an event. Reporting requirements 
are normally timebound (i.e., 72 h). Most organisations endeavour to notify the necessary 
stakeholders as soon as possible, often by telephone in the first instance. As many airline 
staff are employed on a shift work basis, the window of 72 h is useful in support of 
administering the reporting function. It is not unusual to have numerous points of contact 
for reporting within organisations. However, reporting generally follows a consistent 
route regardless of who the initial point of contact is. Some organisations appear to 
empower and encourage the submission of reports by any individual. Other organisations 
appear to endorse reporting through a ‘chain of command’. Regardless of the chosen 
initial reporting route input, all reports are progressed to a ‘gate-keeper’ within an 
organisation. The people responsible initially for examining the validity and 
completeness of submitted reports often hold a key position in either the quality 
assurance, technical services or maintenance departments. Generally, there is a strong 
awareness of the need to report incidents and occurrences classified as mandatory. There 
may be numerous motivational reasons to report, such as ethical, safety, compliance with 
regulatory requirements and best practice for example. Those submitting reports embrace 
mandatory reporting as an obligation underpinned by the cultural norms of aircraft 
maintenance and continuing airworthiness management. When an issue is discovered, it 
is progressed through the reporting system regardless of its status. Many organisations 
welcome all reports including non-mandatory events that are highlighted through 
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voluntary reporting streams. They evidently see value in including them in their analysis 
of events and the subsequent learning opportunities the reports may offer. 
 
5.5.2. Single, Double and Triple-Loop Learning 
From an organisational point of view, single-loop learning can be experienced when an 
error is detected and corrected but little else changes, Argyris and Schön (1996) (p. 18). 
In aircraft line maintenance environments where a ‘find and fix’ ethos prevails, single-
loop learning is often evident. It is not unusual for technical issues to befall an aircraft’s 
departure time. Such pressure points often associated with fulfilling contractual 
obligations may have a negative impact on the potential for learning from a related event. 
In such cases, if issue arises the matter may be resolved without any further recorded 
action. Because of the terse nature of the experience for an individual concerned, the 
opportunity for further learning may not extended beyond the single loop. Argyris and 
Schön (1996) (p. 21) and Lukic et al. (2012) proffer double-loop learning as learning that 
takes place and results in organisational norms and theory in use being altered. Presently, 
aircraft certifying, and support staff are obliged to continuously preserve an adequate 
understanding of the aircraft being maintained and managed along with associated 
regulations and procedures. A desired outcome of double-loop learning is often witnessed 
for example through the adjustment of environmental, behavioural and procedural norms. 
Instances of double-loop learning can be evident following unsuccessful attempts through 
single-loop learning. In-service continuation training is an effective enabler that is 
capable of supporting double-loop learning. Organisations are also required by EU 
1321/2014 (1321/2014) to establish and maintain a continuation training programme for 
staff. A primary pillar of continuation training syllabi is the use of incidents and 
occurrences as lesson content for influencing organisational norms and behaviour in 
support of preventing recurrence of incidents and occurrences. Deutero-learning (triple-
loop) relates to when members of an organisation reflect upon previous learning and sets 
about to improve how the organisation can refine and improve the process of learning 
from events, (Argyris and Schön 1996) (p. 29), (Bateson 1972). This could also be stated 
as learning how to learn by seeking to improve single and double loop learning. Although 
deutero-learning may be considered as a natural extension of other levels of learning, the 
concept does not feature as a requirement in aircraft maintenance and continuing 
airworthiness management regulatory codes.  
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5.5.3. Learning Product 
Aircraft maintenance and management regulatory codes require reporting of “any 
identified condition of the aircraft or component that has resulted or may result in an 
unsafe condition that hazards seriously the flight safety” (1321/2014). Generally, a 
learning product can originate from numerous information sources within the aircraft 
maintenance and continuing airworthiness management arena. Specifically, GM1 
145.A.30(e) (1321/2014) requires the use of accident and incident reports in support of 
the mandatory human factors training content. The intent of this material is to ensure 
information is imparted upon the organisations’ staff in support of preventing the subject 
event reoccurrence. Such continuation training is mandated by European requirements 
for all aircraft maintenance and continuing airworthiness management organisations. 
Continuation training is also a product as well as a medium for imparting learning from 
incidents. Inputs to continuation training syllabi often feature learning from incidents and 
experience augmented by safety notices, toolbox talks and are recognised as a means of 
presenting the learning product to operational staff. Drupsteen and Guldenmund (2014) 
cite, Lampel et al. (2009) where they use the term “learning about events”. This is further 
explained as “information about events is shared and diffused to help create new ideas”, 
in this case in the support of safe operations. 
 
5.5.4 Effectiveness of Learning 
The evaluation of any initiative’s success is much more straight forward when clear 
objective indicators (learning outcomes) are employed. In the case of learning in an 
aircraft maintenance and management environment, organisations can generally employ 
indicators such as inspection non-compliance, audit findings and rates of incident 
reoccurrence in support of gauging the effectiveness of learning. Probing salient aspects 
such as timely investigation of incidents, assessing the learning content and feedback are 
a starting point for assessing effectiveness. Cooke (2003) concludes the absence of or 
poor information can compromise the effectiveness of feedback. He also suggests that if 
the feedback cycle is ailing, the climate may deteriorate and have a negative impact upon 
organisational safety. From a commercial viewpoint, it is perhaps understandable that 
aircraft tend to only generate revenue when flying. However, airline operators need to 
maintain a balance between safe operations and productivity. It is essential that incident 
causal factors are fully identified and adequate time and resources are available to support 
this important aspect of learning. Cooke (2003) endorses a suggestion that increased 
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reporting of incidents enhances continuous improvement in high reliability industries. 
However, establishing adequate causation is also an attribute capable of supporting 
effective learning from an event in dynamic environments.  
The importance also of just culture as an enabler for incident reporting and subsequent 
effective learning cannot be ignored. Under-reporting of events resulting from a single-
loop learning experiences amongst operational maintenance staff and production 
pressures can also impact negatively upon efforts to propagate a learning environment. 
McDonald et al. (2000) suggest from their analysis, ‘that there is a strong professional 
sub-culture, which is relatively independent of the organization. One implication of this 
finding is that this professional subculture mediates the effect of the organizational safety 
system on normal operational practice’. von Thaden and Gibbons (2008), conclude safety 
culture “refers to the extent to which individuals and groups will commit to personal 
responsibility for safety; act to preserve, enhance and communicate safety information; 
strive to actively learn, adapt and modify (both individual and organizational) behaviour 
based on lessons learned from mistakes . . . . . . . . .”.  A just culture is defined in the 
affecting regulation EU 376/2014 (376/2014) as, “a culture in which front line operators 
or other persons are not punished for actions, omissions, or decisions taken by them, that 
are commensurate with their experience and training, but in which gross negligence, 
wilful violations and destructive acts are not tolerated”. Accordingly, a just culture is a 
fair culture. The effectiveness of the learning system can also be compromised by its 
efficiency as well as its inadequacies. The volume of information that staff must process 
and assimilate is continually increasing. Guardians of learning outcomes should be 
mindful that staff risk becoming information weary as a result of the ever-increasing 
demands on their cognitive abilities.  
 
5.5.5 Types of Knowledge  
This relates to; conceptual, dispositional, procedural and locative knowledge forms 
(Thorndike 1918). One of the key objectives of learning from incidents is to identify the 
type of knowledge needed to prevent an issue recurring. When a reportable issue for 
example is discovered, the submitted report will identify ‘what’ happened. Subsequent 
follow-up will set out to determine ‘why’ the issue occurred. The guiding principles of 
‘how’ to perform the task or operation are often contained in procedures or data particular 
to the task. The information contained in procedures will enable a person to utilise other 
forms of knowledge. Prevailing culture within an organisation will have an impact on 
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learning from incidents. If a strong commercial culture exists, this may have an impact 
on for example the depth and breadth of learning from incidents within the company. 
Induction and initial training for new staff is an important element for demonstrating 
where organisational sources of information can be accessed. Accident data repositories 
contain many well documented examples of human factor related precursors to incidents. 
Many of which may have originated in poor access to approved data and culminated in 
serious and possibly preventable incidents. Acknowledging and addressing the limitations 
related to the types of knowledge when developing continuation training programmes 
would have a positive impact on participants. The enabling industry requirements do not 
specify any discernible differences in how the types of knowledge are differentiated. A 
review of the human factors syllabus requirements did not highlight a need to appreciate 




It has been highlighted during this research that the opportunity to learn from incidents is 
not being fully embraced in the aircraft maintenance and continuing airworthiness 
management segment of the industry. While the idea of eliminating all incidents is a 
fallacy, reducing their numbers and potential for harm is a reality. Air travel is on the 
increase and it is envisaged that current sectors flown will have doubled within the next 
two decades. If current levels of safety were to remain stagnant with a doubling in activity, 
twice the current fatality rate would surely not be acceptable. Many people relate safety 
to freedom from risk and danger (Reason 1997). Unfortunately, risk and danger are often 
ubiquitous in the presence of aircraft maintenance and continuing airworthiness 
management activities. Managing sources of risk and danger is a tall order for some 
organisations. Document 9859 (ICAO 2013b) recognises that “aviation systems cannot 
be completely free of hazards and associated risk”. However, the guidance does 
acknowledge that as long as the appropriate measures are in place to control these risks, 
a satisfactory balance between ‘production and protection’ can be achieved. Perrow 
(1999) (p. 356) acknowledges that “we load our complex systems with safety devices in 
the form of buffers, redundancies, circuit breakers, alarms, bells, and whistles’ because 
no system is perfect”. 
Detecting and identifying hazards highlighted through incident reporting systems is 
recommended by ICAO standards and recommended practices as an effective means of 
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achieving practicable levels of safe operations. Therefore, objective data mined from a 
reporting system offers the potential to enlighten aviation stakeholders and to illuminate 
weakness that may be present. Such information can assist with a better understanding of 
events and augment mitigating measures against the potential effects of these hazards. 
When incidents occur, this can be an indication of a failure in an organisation’s process 
and/or practice. Because of continuous challenges faced by organisations in the aviation 
industry, there is still potential to learn from resulting incidents and pre-cursors. The 
learning is based on the potential new knowledge available from the associated collection, 
analysis and interventions for these events. Effective learning can be considered as a 
successful translation of safety information into knowledge that actively improves the 
operating environment and helps prevent recurrence of unwelcome events. 
The paper features a brief exercise to demonstrate how safety information can be 
translated into lessons capable of augmenting knowledge within an aircraft maintenance 
and management organisation. To support this, fifteen occurrences drawn from an 
ECCAIRS incident database portal were analysed. The result of the analysis along with 
potential causation factors are presented. Additionally, a simple mechanism in support of 
the delivery of associated safety lessons was developed and is presented in Table 6.1 
above. Integrating the known causal factors with the ‘Dirty Dozen’ taxonomy which is 
already associated with this aviation segment provides a useful template for continuation 
training in the segment. The emerging incident/occurrence themes related to the featured 
events are briefly discussed and presented within the document. The publication also 
introduces a framework that assembles and explains the main elements of an incident 
within its lifecycle. The purpose of this is to illustrate tacit aspects of an incident that have 
the potential to augment learning within the process. In order to leverage the maximum 
benefit from details of an incident, learning processes must recognise the existence of 
these event components. There can therefore be a formal approach to gauging the 
effectiveness of learning and a means of identifying underperforming elements of the 
learning process. This publication could assist subject organisations with a review of their 
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The following Conclusions chapter will outline the research outputs and how the 
objectives were met. The utility value of the work and opportunities for future research 
will be considered. 
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Chapter 6. Conclusion 
The research has highlighted that the opportunity to learn from incidents is not being fully 
embraced in the aircraft maintenance and management segment of the industry. While the 
idea of eliminating all incidents is a fallacy, reducing the number of events and the 
potential for harm is a reality. Structured and continuous safety management actions, such 
as collection of data, analysis and intervention can be enabled with the support of the 
necessary safety intelligence. Air travel is on the increase and it is envisaged that current 
sectors flown will have doubled within the next two decades. If present levels of safety 
were to remain stagnant with a doubling in activity, twice the current fatality rate would 
surely not be acceptable. However, because of continuous challenges faced by 
organisations in the aviation industry, there is still potential to learn from resulting 
incidents and pre-cursors. 
 
 
Figure 6.1. Architecture of papers and contribution to research questions. 
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The study’s over-arching research questions are again shown in figure 6.1. Chapter 2 
considers the current body of literature that supports learning from incidents and 
addresses all three research questions. The outputs from this chapter reveal how learning 
takes place within a specified set of organisations and brings forward enablers and 
constraints to learning from incidents. 
Chapter 3 examines the statutory requirements for the aircraft maintenance and 
continuing airworthiness management segment. The prescribed mechanisms and their 
constraints are identified and directly address all three research questions. 
Chapter 4 documents the current situation in respect of learning from incidents within the 
subject domain. The analysis of the data uncovered how staff learn from incidents and 
which enabling and constraining factors exist within the organisations under focus. 
Chapter 5 presents an innovative approach to improving LFI through the identification of 
learning constraints presented in the earlier papers. The augmentations are centred around 
an improvement in focus on the learning product withing the learning cycle. 
As evidenced by the research, many contributing factors impinge on the effectiveness of 
learning initiatives. A concomitant way to augment the segment’s regulatory oversight 
would be to expedite the transition to a risk-based methodology. An effective input to 
oversight is the output from lessons learned, where potential risks can be adequately 
addressed, and proportional mitigating effort brought to bear where necessary. While the 
EU requirements for aircraft maintenance and management currently define a high-level 
syllabus for human factors training content, it does not provide guidance on lesson 
content, consider organisational behaviour or suggest basic qualification and competence 
requirements for instructors.  
Following the analysis of data specifically collected for this project and related literature, 
the main conclusions can be summarised as follows: 
• Under-reporting of incidents can be due to cultural norms established amongst 
maintenance crews and/or production pressures. 
• Establishing root cause and ancillary factors related to an incident are not always 
adequately resourced. Therefore, potential available lessons are not always 
highlighted and translated in lessons learned.  
• No formal qualification or competence requirements exist for staff responsible for 
developing and delivering mandatory human factors (HF) training that comprises 
of lessons learned content.  
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• Just culture has a positive impact upon incident reporting rates.  
Failure to formally reflect fundamental principles of learning in the implementing 
requirements will continue to detract from the effectiveness of initial and continuation 
training initiatives. Often, due to perceived cost considerations, organisations tend to only 
expend sufficient effort to meet minimum compliance requirements. Therefore, the EU 
directive concerned should be amended without delay to include effective guidance in 
support of augmenting its capability in terms of risk-based oversight initiatives. The study 
results could be used to develop terms of reference to establish a European Aviation 
Safety Agency (EASA) working group capable of updating rule-making requirements in 
the area of focus. The research could also be applied to the analyses of incidents and 
further employed in support of examining organisational use and productivity of incident 
learning data. 
In addition to addressing the research objectives, this collective body of work makes a 
significant contribution at the level of the individual stakeholder, the organisation and 
those with domain regulatory oversight obligations.  The work illuminates a pressing need 
to broach the matter within the area under focus. The relationships between the 
expectation to effectively learn from incidents and what is inferred in mandated 
procedural form is not well appointed in the segment requirements. This inherent 
deficiency may be a causal factor that has propagated a paradigm that undervalues the 
capability learning from incidents continues to present. Moreover, it may also share 
responsibility for the light-touch approach underpinning the regulatory edifice. 
Acknowledging the findings that arise could influence and augment improvements in 
competence & causation requirements and further inform a model that articulates a useful 
learning product centric archetype. 
The aim of the research has been to uncover enablers & impediments to learning from 
incidents and to put forward the utility value of this research. To this end, the research 
adopted an interpretative/exploratory stance supported by a multi-method research design 
strategy. The work brings into focus some primary underlying reasons underpinning the 
under-performance and under-recognised benefits of fully embracing the credo of 
learning from incidents. The contribution this thesis makes to the body of knowledge is 
abridged in the following short paragraphs.  
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The literature re-affirmed the existence of a solid infrastructure capable of supporting the 
delivery of effective lessons within the area of research focus. Continuing airworthiness 
as an operational subset is both enabled and impeded by the implementing requirements. 
This empirical research discloses the further potential impairment associated with 
maintaining inadequate causation practices and a poor or absent just culture. Existing 
systematic literature reviews in this area are scarce and this research provides a basis to 
progressively examine the efficacy of current organisational approaches to learning. 
The work also features learning through the lens of the subject activity’s enabling and 
modulating prerequisites. A set of pertinent regulatory standards and recommended 
practices are reviewed within the context of learning from incidents within the specific 
area of continuing airworthiness. This review culminated in a contextualist view where 
the emerging effects of light-touch regulation, absence of specific minimum competence 
requirements for key knowledge transfer staff, the need to fully appreciate the impact of 
safety culture and the absence of causation guidelines are made obvious by their omission 
from regulatory tomes. The research outputs are valid inputs for those tasked with the 
development of regulation and best practice, not only in the aviation sector but also 
parallel high-reliability domains. With the projected increases in air movement in the 
coming years and the need to reciprocate with progressive oversight methodologies, this 
independent research is a valuable digest. 
The encompassing qualitative study offers an insight into how lessons are actually 
delivered within the participating organisations. It also considers the inherent 
infrastructural challenges that exist as a backdrop to this activity. The study offers a deep 
insight into the evolution of the data gathering instrument and features the rich benefits 
accrued from the related focus group activity whilst also recounting the influence the 
outputs from the literature review had on the instrument’s development. The application 
and documentation of a thematic analysis within the area of learning from incidents is 
considered a novel approach that capably captures the themes that emerged from the data 
sets. Evidence of multi-domain impediments shared by the subject segment are set forth 
in the systematic literature review’s a priori domain epitomes which are considered at an 
applied level. Echoes of inadequate causation and poorly designed incident learning 
syllabi to name some of the encumbrances, clearly resonate within the results. The 
emerging salience of the research outputs could serve as a baseline for affected 
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stakeholders wishing to gauge performance of existing oversight systems or those solely 
pursuing a means of introducing improvements.  
The application of the LFI principles to an incident subset illustrates one means of 
translating safety data into tangible lessons from incidents. This approach is a clear and 
unambiguous means of highlighting the learning potential incidents can present. The 
intention is to provide a simple exemplar capable of providing a consistent input to 
mandatory recurrent training syllabi. Additionally, the learning product centric view of 
an incident in its lifecycle amplifies the importance of learning from incidents to all 
stakeholders committed to preventing event reoccurrence. 
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